PATTERNS OF POWER

The Viceroyalty of Peru

New Castile, and the Kingdoms of Peru

1532 — 1824

A case study in the Patterns of Power series

Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic)

Held as tested, not revealed

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FRONT MATTER

Preface and Outline

Front matter · how this study was made, the disciplines it holds itself to, and a map of its fourteen parts

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The collaboration

This is a case study in the *Patterns of Power* series, applying the series' framework to the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru, from the ambush at Cajamarca on 16 November 1532 to the defeat of the last royalist army at Ayacucho on 9 December 1824. The framework is a lens for reading how any order of power is founded, dressed, and held: the floor of force beneath every order, the robe of doctrine laid over the floor to make the force cheap, the settlement that divides the spoils, the cost column in which each subject prices defection, the seam that manages the belief on which the whole depends, the default by which an elite coordinates without instruction, and — running through all of it — position logic, the proposition that rulers in like positions converge on like solutions because a position poses a problem with only a few good answers.

Peru was chosen as a control. The study that preceded it in the series, on Ireland under the Union, found a colonial formation that failed completely over a hundred and twenty-one years; Spanish America is where the same operation is generally said to have succeeded, and the case was taken up to find the variable that separates them. It also offered three things no other case in the collection had. Its floor sits nearly three centuries before its interesting politics, so that the sixteenth-century conquest, the seventeenth-century consolidation, the Bourbon eighteenth century and the years from 1808 are four different countries and the study must always say which one it means. Its conquered order was itself a conquest caught mid-build — Inca expansion out of Cuzco began somewhere between about 1400 and 1438, and Pizarro landed in 1532 — so the collection could watch, for once, a naturalisation that had not yet had time to take. And it has at minimum four populations rather than two, with mestizo and casta positions that none of the four describes, which made a two-column reading impossible from the first page.

The study was built the way the series is built, one module at a time. The author brought the framework, the direction, and the judgement of the whole, and sent his own thinking on each module's function before it was drafted; Claude, Anthropic's model, did the research — verifying every load-bearing quotation, date and figure by search against a source reproducing the primary text before any module was written — and produced the drafts, each presented

and confirmed before the next was begun. The framework's concepts are the series'; the Peruvian application, and the refinements and refutations it yielded, are the work of the collaboration.

Its engine throughout is the method of information asymmetry. The study exists to show the gap between what was said at the metropole and what was done in the colony, and it works by setting exact words beside exact words: the Granada capitulations' pledge to let the conquered live *en su ley* beside the order of 1502 to accept baptism or depart; a secretary's report that only one horse was slightly wounded beside an Inca's account of men killed like sheep in the same square on the same afternoon; a bull granting the Indies for the propagation of the faith beside a viceroy's commission to prove the Incas tyrants; a King forbidding the word *conquest* one year after his viceroy beheaded the last Inca. It lays out the arithmetic and leaves the sum to the reader. It does not preach the conclusion.

The disciplines

Five rules govern every module.

Quotation. Public-domain primary sources — bulls, capitulations, royal decrees, ordinances, chronicles, catechisms, petitions — are quoted exactly, in Spanish with translation, at the length the argument needs, because in a legal fiction the precise wording *is* the evidence. Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased, briefly, and credited.

No fabrication. No quotation, date, attribution or figure is ever invented or reconstructed from memory. What cannot be verified is dropped or flagged, never guessed. This case required that discipline more than most: the pre-contact Andean population is the most contested quantity in the field, and this study asserts no figure for it anywhere, giving instead the published positions of the named estimators and the spread between them.

Gravity without partisanship. Suffering is held with gravity, and the study refuses both flattery and demonisation — it names the legal fiction as fiction and explains the order's logic without excusing it. Its recurring watchword is *legibility is not pardon*: to understand how a thing was done is not to forgive its being done. The Black Legend and the White Legend are treated here as what they are, two positions with sponsors, and Bartolomé de las Casas is used throughout as evidence of what a Dominican could say to a king and have acted upon, not as a source for what happened in the Indies.

Contribution, culled. Every module returns what it found to the framework, stated plainly in its closing section — but the series warns that a study claiming a revision in every module has usually manufactured most of them, and the closing module of this one accordingly separates one central finding and five smaller additions from a longer list of applications and confirmations, and marks each for what it is.

Held as tested, not revealed. The pattern is treated as something discovered and tested against the evidence, not handed down as doctrine. Three predictions this study inherited from its predecessor were broken by the research and the corrections are recorded in the modules where they arose.

What Peru added to the framework

The central finding is one thing seen from four positions, and the series already holds part of it: the variable that sets the shape of a conquest order is whether the conqueror needs the producer or the producer's ground. The framework names that fork inside its extraction module; this study found it governing the settlement's object, the exit dial's setting, the fate of the subsistence base, and the point in the order's lifespan at which the mass death falls — and proposes moving it into the spine.

Five smaller additions survive the cull: that a collective tax fixed at a census and never revised is an automatically escalating levy that no decree raises and no petition can name; that a state which sells its rotating offices converts each officeholder into a proprietor who must extract to recoup, so that the recovery instrument becomes the order's characteristic abuse and eventually its *casus belli*; that formation installs through the administration of the life cycle rather than the persuasion of the mind, so that the party holding the register of births, marriages and burials will eventually be handed the belief; that a vacancy fiction need never call a country empty if it can measure what the inhabitants need and declare the remainder free; and that where a factional fight yields a *seat* rather than a *right*, the residue is capped and the definition of personhood is adjusted until the arithmetic works.

The study also broke three inherited predictions, and says so where it found them: that Spain succeeded at formation by destroying the rival carrier, when in fact it evangelised in Quechua and spent a century and a half failing to destroy anything; that the demographic ratio does not govern a settler faction's capacity to separate, when Peru's creoles stayed royalist for sixteen years after the metropolitan floor had ceased to exist; and that Toledo's resettlement destroyed the Andean vertical portfolio, when the best modern work finds the ecological access negotiated and preserved.

The arc

A landscape opening and twelve modules, each with a framework function and its own title.

Landscape — the two societies on the eve of conquest. The Dead King Keeps His Fields. A property regime in which a dead ruler kept his estates and his household and was carried out to festivals to be consulted, set against a Castile forty years past Granada that was still taking apart the terms on which it had accepted that surrender — and the repertoire, already finished in the Canaries and the Caribbean, that both of them were about to meet.

1 — The Floor of Force. One Horse, Slightly Wounded. The entire Spanish casualty return for Cajamarca, set beside an Inca's account of the same hour; and then the forty years, sixteen of them spent by Spaniards killing Spaniards, that it actually took to hold the country.

2 — The Settlement. A Grant of People. A conquest that divided tribute streams rather than land because the conquered order had already built the machine that collected them, the arithmetic at Guaynarima that could not seat one claimant in five, and the mercury monopoly that mattered more than any of it.

3 — The Robe. A Secure and Quiet Harbour for Your Royal Conscience. A title granted by a Pope on condition of conversion, the Salamanca theologian who demolished it, and the history a viceroy commissioned in Cuzco six months before he beheaded the last Inca.

4 — Formation. Four Hundred and Seventy-Seven Bodies Taken Out of the Church. An extirpator's own count from thirty-one villages in eighteen months, the eight years a kuraka's heir spent boarding away from his father, and the register that did the work the sermon could not.

5 — The Cost Column. Four Reales and Eleven. What the same mountain paid the same man depending on whether he could leave, and the officials who wrote to the King in 1692 that flight had won.

6 — Extraction. A Tax Payable Only in Silver. The medium-of-payment test running three centuries before the African hut taxes, the Crown taking its cut twice on the same mercury, and an assessment frozen in the 1570s against a population that then halved.

7 — Information and Suppression. A Book That Was Safe for a Hundred and Seventy-Two Years. An Inquisition whose docket was almost entirely Spanish, a seam held open across an ocean without an electorate, and the year a licensed book of 1609 became sedition.

8 — Elite Coordination and the Default. The Office That Was Sold. A rotation machine built by men who had watched encomenderos kill a viceroy, and the fiscal decision that turned every officeholder into a proprietor with a debt to recoup.

9 — Plurality or Foreclosure. Fifteen Million and Ten. An order whose conquered subjects sued their conquerors and won, and the parliament that had to decide who counted as a person before it could decide how many seats America got.

10 — Change and Collapse. An Interested Spectator. A rising that repriced the order without authoring it, a floor that vanished in a French border town, and a creole elite that had watched 1780 and did not move.

11 — The Grim Accounting. The Debt That Was Not Called. The numbers nobody can agree on, the famine that did not come, and why an extractor who needs the producer preserves the thing that keeps him alive.

12 — Convergence and Divergence. Whether He Needs the Man or the Ground. The case read against the corpus, the three inherited predictions it broke, and the strongest argument for the order stated in full and answered.

◆

A note on sources. This front matter is descriptive and makes no primary-source claims of its own; every factual assertion about the case is established, with its sources and with its limits marked, in the module it summarises. The framework it describes is the series'; the disciplines it lists are the ones the modules hold themselves to and document in their own closing notes. Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

LANDSCAPE

The Dead King Keeps His Fields

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Nothing but the lordship

Pedro de Cieza de León was in Cuzco in August 1550, taking down from the old men of the city an account of how their kings had been buried, and he recorded a rule of property that has no equivalent anywhere in the law he had grown up under. The son of a dead Inca, he wrote, took nothing for himself but the office. *Muerto uno destos señores tan grandes, no aplicaba su hijo para sí otra cosa que el señorío, porque era ley entre ellos que la riqueza y el aparato real del que habia sido rey del Cuzco, no lo hobiese otro en su poder, ni se perdiese su memoria* — when one of these great lords died, his son applied to himself nothing other than the lordship, because it was a law among them that the wealth and royal apparatus of him who had been king of Cuzco should not pass into another's possession, nor his memory be lost. Cieza then described what happened to the estate that did not pass. A figure was made and given the dead king's name; it was carried out into the square of Cuzco at the festivals, and around it stood his women and his servants, who laid out food and drink; each figure had its own spokesmen, who kept the crowd pleased with cheerful words. All the treasure the lord had held while living stayed in the keeping of his household. And, Cieza added, *no dejaban de tener sus chácaras, ques nombre de heredades* — they did not fail to have their *chácaras*, which is the word for estates, where the maize and other provisions were gathered that maintained the women and the rest of the household of these lords who had figures and memorials, though they were already dead.

Read that as a Castilian notary would have had to read it, and the difficulty is not that the arrangement is strange. It is that there is nothing in it to convey. A Castilian could recognise an entail, a mortmain, a chantry endowed to say masses for a founder's soul; what he could not recognise was a landholder who was dead, who was physically present at public ceremonies, who was consulted, who through his spokesmen gave or withheld consent to the marriages of his descendants, and whose fields were worked to feed his household four generations after his burial. The estate was not held *in trust for* the dead man. It was held *by* him. The modern term for the arrangement is split inheritance, coined by Geoffrey Conrad and Arthur Demarest in 1984; the corporate descent groups that maintained each dead ruler are the *panacas*, and the preserved body at the centre of each was a *mallqui*, counted among the most powerful of the *huacas*, the sacred things and places whose network organised the Andean year. How systematic the rule was is argued over, and every chronicler who describes

it was writing after the conquest, from testimony given to conquerors. What is not in doubt is that Spaniards who had every reason to find the arrangement absurd described it consistently, and that they found the estates still being worked for the dead when they arrived.

The same chapter records something else worth holding, because it is a mechanism and not a curiosity. The making of the figure was not automatic. When a king died the elders of the city debated what kind of life he had led, what he had done for the commonwealth, what battles he had won — and only if he was judged to have deserved lasting fame was the figure ordered made. A ruler found to have been slack or cowardly was to be spoken of little. Cieza reports the rule being applied: the Inca Yupanqui who had abandoned Cuzco before the Chanca attack was buried without the honours given to the others and was given no figure at all. An order that can posthumously strike a king from its own record has a procedure for deciding who was legitimate, and it ran that procedure on its own dead.

The engine, and what it cost the edge

Once the rule is stated, its consequence follows without anyone having to intend it. If a new Inca inherits the office and none of the land, then the only way he can acquire an estate — for himself in life, for his own *panaca* and his own mummy afterwards — is to take one from somebody who has not yet been conquered. Expansion was not an ambition that successive rulers happened to share. It was the way a man in that position got paid.

An order built this way solves a problem that defeats many others, and buys the solution on credit. It has no surplus of unprovided claimants pressing on the centre, because every generation's claimants are pointed outward at ground the order does not yet hold; the pressure that elsewhere turns inward and splits an elite is here discharged, by constitutional necessity, at the frontier. What it purchases with that is speed, and what it cannot purchase is time. Belief of the kind that makes an order cheap to hold is installed across generations, in children, through a calendar and a schooling and a set of duties that come to seem like the shape of the world rather than somebody's arrangement. A conquest that must keep conquering is always adding subjects at the outer edge faster than any such process can work on them. The core may be thoroughly formed. The rim is always new.

The record shows the Inca themselves managing the consequence rather than escaping it, with the standard instrument of a state that does not trust its subjects: the *mitimaes*, populations lifted out of their home provinces and resettled elsewhere. Cieza is explicit about the purpose in the capital itself — the city of Cuzco was full of foreign peoples, *todo de industria*, all by design, so that there being many lineages of men among them, they should not agree together for a rising. He then names two of the peoples living there in his own day

under that arrangement: Chachapoyas and Cañaris. Both would furnish the invaders with allies. And in the last reign before the invasion the northern edge was still openly refusing: the peoples of Otavalo, Cayambe, Cochasquí and Pifo, Cieza records, made a league together with many others *de no dejarse sojuzgar del Inca, sino ántes morir que perder su libertad* — not to let themselves be subjugated by the Inca, but rather to die than lose their liberty. Huayna Capac put that league down. His grandsons were fighting each other within a decade.

How long the order had been running is genuinely uncertain and the uncertainty matters, because the whole question of how far the conquest had settled into custom turns on it. The traditional chronology — Pachacuti deposing his father and beginning the campaigns of imperial conquest in 1438 — comes from Cabello Balboa, writing in 1586 from Inca oral testimony recorded by Spaniards. Brian Bauer's work on the Cuzco region proposed around 1400 as a better approximate date for the beginning of the Inca period there, though he was marking the appearance of imperial-style pottery rather than the expansion itself. Take the range at its widest and Tawantinsuyu had been an expanding empire for something between ninety and a hundred and thirty years when the Spanish landed. The figure that measures how young the conquest was is itself an artefact assembled inside the conquest that ended it.

The house divided

Then the arithmetic broke twice in eight years. Huayna Capac died in an epidemic — dated by different sources between about 1524 and 1527, most often attributed to smallpox arriving overland ahead of the men who carried it, though the identification is contested and other pathogens have been proposed — and his designated heir Ninan Cuyochi died in the same outbreak or immediately after. The disease reached the Andes before the Spanish did; the first thing the invasion did to Peru, it did without anybody arriving.

What followed was a war between Huáscar, holding Cuzco and the old *panacas*, and Atahualpa, holding the northern army. It is worth noticing where the property rule sits in that quarrel. The dead kings of Cuzco were not bystanders in a succession dispute; they held the land, their households held the treasure, and their spokesmen held a voice in whether a marriage or a claim was good. A ruler in Cuzco who wished to govern for the living was arguing with an interest that owned much of the valley and could not be outlived. Atahualpa's forces defeated and captured Huáscar at Quipaipán, west of Cuzco, in April 1532. Loyalties to the losing side had not disappeared, and the winner had not yet fastened his rule on the whole of it, when Francisco Pizarro came inland with a force conventionally given as a hundred and sixty-eight men and twenty-seven horses and met him at Cajamarca on 16 November 1532.

En su ley

The men who arrived there came from a kingdom that had completed its own conquest of a people of another faith exactly forty years before, and that had spent those forty years reversing the terms on which it did so.

The Emirate of Granada surrendered on terms agreed in late November 1491 and running to some sixty-seven articles. Their central promise reads: *Que sus altezas y sus sucesores para siempre jamás dejarán vivir al rey Abí Abdilehi y á sus alcaides, cadís, meftís, alguaciles, caudillos y hombres buenos y á todo el común, chicos y grandes, en su ley, y no les consentirán quitar sus mezquitas ni sus torres ni los almuédanos, ni les tocarán en los habices y rentas que tienen para ellas, ni les perturbarán los usos y costumbres en que están* — that their Highnesses and their successors, for ever and ever, shall let the king and his alcaides, qadis, muftis, alguaciles, chiefs and good men, and the whole community, small and great, live in their own law; and shall not permit their mosques or their minarets or their muezzins to be taken from them, nor touch the pious endowments and revenues held for them, nor disturb the usages and customs in which they stand. A further article provides that the Moors be judged in their own suits by the law they are accustomed to keep, on the opinion of their own qadis and judges. Another undertakes that their arms and horses shall not be taken from them, now or at any time for ever, excepting only gunpowder weapons. The Alhambra was handed over on 2 January 1492.

None of this was improvised. It was the standard Castilian and Aragonese settlement with a conquered Muslim population, four centuries old by then and applied from Toledo in 1085 onward: the *mudéjar* arrangement, under which Muslims under Christian rule kept their religion, their language, their customs and their own law, administered by their own judges within self-governing communities, in exchange for tribute and for recognising a Christian lord. Its structure is not a Christian invention. It is the *dhimma* — the protected, tolerated, separately-governed and separately-taxed status of the non-Muslim under Islamic rule — turned over and run in the other direction, and the historians who describe it say so plainly. Castile had learned how to hold a conquered people of another faith by conquering one, and had taken the instrument along with the ground.

The important thing about the *mudéjar* bargain, for what came after, is its shape: toleration in exchange for tribute, with a parallel jurisdiction, an assigned native leadership, and a fiscal obligation marking the status. Every element of that would cross the Atlantic. Not every element would survive the crossing.

The reversal

Because the bargain was being taken apart in Spain in the same decade that Spain acquired America, and the sequence is short enough to set out in full.

The sorting mechanism came first and was aimed at converts, not at unbelievers. The Sentencia-Estatuto adopted at Toledo in 1449, during a rising against royal authority, barred *conversos* — Christians of Jewish descent — from municipal office and from testifying, on pain of death and confiscation. Ecclesiastics objected, including the Pope, on the ground that it implied baptism was insufficient; the statutes spread anyway, and by 1500 most Spanish institutions of consequence required proof of *limpieza de sangre*, clean blood, meaning ancestry free of Jewish or Muslim descent. A doctrine that a man's religion is what he professes had been supplemented, inside Christendom's most militantly Christian kingdom, by a doctrine that his standing is what his grandparents were.

Then the expulsions and the breach. In March 1492, ten weeks after the Alhambra was surrendered, the Jews of Spain were ordered to convert or leave. In 1499 Cardinal Cisneros began compelling conversions in Granada, imprisoning and ill-treating the uncooperative — the noblemen especially — until they submitted; in December of that year he informed Alexander VI that three thousand had converted in a single day. His own church council warned him that the methods might breach the treaty. The Albaicín rose, and the revolt in the Alpujarras that followed was suppressed and then used as the ground for cancelling the guarantees, on the argument that rebellion had forfeited them. By royal order of 12 February 1502 the Muslims of Castile were required to accept baptism or depart. *Para siempre jamás* had lasted a little over ten years. The descendants of those who stayed were expelled from Spain between 1609 and 1614.

What sailed west, then, was not the instrument of 1491. It was the instrument of 1502: the parallel jurisdiction retained, the assigned native headmen retained, the tribute retained, the separate legal status retained — and the toleration deleted, because the *indio*, unlike the *mudéjar*, was to be baptised. The two republics into which Spanish America would sort its subjects, one of Spaniards and one of Indians, are a very old European instrument arriving in the New World with one clause already struck out.

The workshop

Nor was the labour system invented in Peru. The word *encomienda* comes out of the Reconquista, where it named the entrusting of a conquered population and its dues to a lord, and the practice of rewarding fighting men with grants of other people's tribute was carried from the peninsula to the Canary Islands, whose conquest ran from 1402 to 1496 and where distribution to the deserving was in use from 1479. Nicolás de Ovando — Commander of the Order of Alcántara, one of the military orders formed to fight the Muslims, a man who had administered *encomiendas* in Spain — reached Hispaniola as governor in 1502 with some two and a half thousand settlers, formalised the distribution of indigenous communities to settlers through royal decrees beginning in 1503, and moved indigenous populations into new congregated settlements. The *requerimiento*, the notarial summons read aloud to populations that could not understand it, was drawn up by the jurist Juan López de Palacios Rubios in 1513 and first read in 1513 or 1514. By the time Pizarro obtained the Capitulación de Toledo on 26 July 1529 — making him governor, captain general and adelantado of lands south of Panama that no one in the room had seen, styling them New Castile, and reserving the royal fifth of whatever was taken — the entire kit had been in service in the Caribbean for a quarter of a century and drew on Iberian practice older than that.

This is worth stating precisely because it changes what the conquest of Peru is a case of. Peru is not where these instruments were designed. It is the first very large application of a repertoire designed elsewhere: partly in the Caribbean between 1493 and 1519, and before that in the Canaries, and before that in the long Iberian business of taking land from Muslims and paying the takers in the labour of the taken. What arrived at Cajamarca was a finished technology, and one of the few genuinely new problems it would meet was the one Cieza wrote down in Cuzco eighteen years later.

The title, and the condition attached to it

One further document has to be on the page, because it is where the Spanish claim to Peru actually came from and because it carries a clause the Crown could not shed.

The bull *Inter caetera*, issued by Alexander VI on 4 May 1493, gave and assigned to Ferdinand and Isabella and their heirs, kings of Castile and Leon, for ever, all islands and mainlands found and to be found west and south of a line a hundred leagues beyond the Azores and Cape Verde, with all their dominions, cities, places and villages and all rights and jurisdictions — provided none were already in the actual possession of a Christian prince. That is the title. It is not a metaphor for the title and there was no other; the whole legal edifice of Spanish America rests on it.

Two things about the document deserve attention. The first is that it explains itself by Granada. The bull recites that the monarchs had long intended to seek out unknown lands in order to bring their inhabitants to the faith, but had been unable to accomplish it while engaged in the siege and recovery of Granada — *but the said kingdom having at length been regained*, they had chosen Columbus and furnished him with ships. And it praises them for what it calls, in these times and with much glory to the Divine Name, their recovery of the kingdom of Granada from the yoke of the Saracens. The instrument that hands Castile the Americas states in its own text that the Americas are what Castile turned to when the Reconquista was finished.

The second is the condition. Having made the grant, the bull commands the monarchs, *in virtue of holy obedience*, to appoint to those lands worthy, God-fearing, learned, skilled and experienced men, in order to instruct the inhabitants in the Catholic faith and train them in good morals. The grant is made for a purpose and the purpose is written into it as a command.

The Crown then acquired the machinery to discharge that command, and acquired it completely. A bull of November 1501 conveyed the tithes of the Indies, with the obligation to found and furnish churches and maintain their clergy from royal funds. A bull of 1504 gave the power to fix diocesan boundaries. On 28 July 1508 Julius II's *Universalis ecclesiae* conferred perpetual patronage, including the right to present candidates for archbishoprics and bishoprics. In 1539 Charles V required that every episcopal petition to Rome pass through him first, and that papal documents carry royal approval before taking effect in his dominions. Twenty-four years before Pizarro landed, the king of Castile chose every bishop in the Indies.

That is total ownership of the institution through which the conquered were to be told what was true. It is also a standard the owner can be held to, by the men he appointed, in the language of the licence he holds his empire under — which is why, when the Dominican Bartolomé de las Casas pressed the argument that the conquests were unlawful, he was not a rival authority to be suppressed but a member of the establishment the Crown itself had endowed, arguing that the employer had failed the condition of his own grant. In April 1550 Charles V halted Spanish conquests in the Americas and convened a panel of theologians, jurists and officials at Valladolid to hear whether they were lawful at all. He held uncontested force in America. He stopped anyway, and paid for a hearing.

Reading the eve of conquest against the framework

Two orders met in November 1532 and neither was old. Castile had been a single monarchy for barely a generation, had finished its own conquest forty years before, had crushed a rising of its own cities in 1521, and was still forcibly converting the descendants of the people whose surrender it had guaranteed for ever and ever. Tawantinsuyu had been expanding for ninety to a hundred and thirty years, was garrisoning its own capital with transplanted foreigners so they could not combine, and had spent the previous three years at war with itself. Neither was the settled, immemorial thing that the other's chroniclers would later describe. Both were builds in progress, and the invaders' advantage lay less in what they were than in which year they arrived.

The refinement this module returns concerns the relation between how an order discharges its surplus claimants and how deeply it can be believed at its edge. The framework already holds that an order which seats fewer claimants than it forms can carry that pressure for a very long time if an outlet stays open, and that pointing the surplus outward is among the more durable answers available. Tawantinsuyu shows the price of the answer when the outlet is not merely available but structurally compulsory. An inheritance rule under which a new ruler receives the office and none of the estate does not permit him to consolidate; it obliges him to conquer, because conquest is the only route to a holding. The order therefore acquires subjects faster than it can make subjects — and the belief that would let it be held cheaply, which is installed in children across generations and cannot be hurried, never catches up with the frontier. Stated plainly: an order whose rule of succession compels each ruler to conquer cannot naturalise its periphery, because its periphery is permanently new. The cohesion bought at the apex is paid for at the rim, and the bill is presented the first time an outsider arrives looking for allies. That the Cañari and the Chachapoya were living in Cuzco as transplanted populations, and that they went over, is the same fact twice.

One further finding belongs here and it is a confirmation rather than a contribution, which is worth marking as such. This collection has already found, working on Ireland, that the instruments it studies are frequently older than the colonies it studies them in, and that a case can look like a workshop when it is really a showroom. Peru confirms it independently and at greater depth. The grant of a conquered population's labour to the men who conquered them; the resettlement of scattered people into administered towns; the parallel legal status for a subject community of another faith, with its own headmen and its own tribute; the formal summons read before lawful war; the licence issued to a private contractor to conquer at his own expense against a share of the proceeds — every one of these was working somewhere else before it reached the Andes, and most of them were working in Spain before they reached the Atlantic. Two independent confirmations from cases three centuries apart is stronger evidence than either alone, and the practical consequence for the corpus is a research habit rather than a doctrine: when an instrument appears in a colony,

look for it at home first.

A note on sources. The Andean material in the first sections is quoted exactly from Pedro de Cieza de León's *Señorío de los Incas*, the second part of his *Crónica del Perú*, composed around 1550 and cited here from the public-domain edition of Marcos Jiménez de la Espada; the passages used are from the chapters on the making of the royal figures, on the *mitimaes*, and on Huayna Capac's northern campaigns, and Cieza dates his own enquiries in Cuzco to August 1550. Readers should hold that Cieza is a conquistador with an encomienda, writing about a defeated order from the testimony of its survivors, some fifteen years after its defeat. The Spanish of the Capitulations of Granada is quoted from the standard reproductions of the text; the terms were agreed on 25 November 1491 and the royal provision reproducing them is dated the 28th, and I have not been able to consult the original instrument. *Inter caetera* is quoted from Frances Gardiner Davenport's translation of 1917, in the public domain. The term *split inheritance* is Conrad and Demarest's, from 1984, and is a modern model rather than a period category; the degree to which the rule operated systematically is disputed among Andeanists, and every early description of it comes through Spanish hands. The Inca chronology is given as a range because it is contested: the 1438 date descends from Cabello Balboa's reconstruction of 1586, and Bauer's radiocarbon-based argument for a start nearer 1400 refers to the Cuzco region's material record rather than to the expansion. Huayna Capac's death is variously dated between about 1524 and 1527 and the pathogen is not securely identified. Pre-contact Andean population estimates run from roughly four million to fifteen million or more depending on the estimator, and no figure is asserted here. The derivation of the *requerimiento* is disputed — a claim of descent from Maliki practice on the summons before jihad has been advanced and answered, notably by Anthony Pagden, who observes that its author knew no Arabic and points instead to Roman and Castilian legal precedent, and recent work locates it in ordinary late-medieval Castilian procedures of formal demand before a notary; the module takes no position beyond noting that the instrument was not new. Modern scholarship on the *mudéjar* status as an inversion of the *dhimma*, on the diffusion of the *encomienda* from the Reconquista through the Canaries to Hispaniola, and on the *limpieza de sangre* statutes is paraphrased and credited rather than quoted. Figures for the size of Pizarro's force at Cajamarca are conventional and derive from participants' accounts.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 1 · THE FLOOR OF FORCE

One Horse, Slightly Wounded

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The casualty return

Francisco de Xerez was Pizarro's secretary, a notary by training, and he was in the square at Cajamarca on the afternoon of 16 November 1532. His account was printed at Seville in 1534, which makes it the earliest published record of what happened, written by a participant, for the Emperor, at the Governor's direction. It contains the day's casualty figures for the Spanish force, and they are worth having exactly before anything else is said.

When the horsemen came back from the pursuit at dusk, the Governor asked whether all had come in well. His captain-general answered *que solo un caballo tenia una pequeña herida* — that only one horse had a small wound. Pizarro himself had taken a cut on the hand, and Xerez is careful to record how: *el Gobernador, por defender á Atabalipa, fué herido de una pequeña herida en la mano* — the Governor, in defending Atahualpa, was wounded by a small wound in the hand. The only Spanish blood shed at Cajamarca was shed by a Spaniard shielding the Inca from his own men.

What the same document says about the other side is that the killing did not stop until dark. Xerez describes the horsemen riding out over the men who fell as they broke the wall of the square, *hiriendo y matando* — wounding and killing — and the footmen falling on those left inside, so that in a short time most of them were *metidos á espada*, put to the sword. Then the crucial sentence, which is his and not a hostile witness's: *En todo esto no alzó indio armas contra español* — in all of this no Indian raised arms against a Spaniard. He explains it as terror at the artillery and the horses, things never seen before.

An hour or so of one-sided killing that costs the winning side one wounded horse is not a battle, and the men who conducted it did not describe it as one. Pizarro's own words that evening, as Xerez reports them, were an act of thanksgiving: *Doy gracias á nuestro Señor... por tan gran milagro como en este dia por nosotros ha fecho* — I give thanks to Our Lord for so great a miracle as He has this day performed for us — adding that without His special aid they could not have entered this land, still less defeated so great a host. The floor's founding act was understood by the man who laid it as evidence of divine favour, and the evidence was the casualty ratio.

The same afternoon, from the other side

The Andean account of the same hour exists, which is rare enough in this collection to be worth pausing on. In 1570 Titu Cusi Yupanqui — son of Manco Inca, grandson of Huayna Capac, then ruling the rump Inca state at Vilcabamba — dictated a narrative in Quechua that was rendered into Spanish by an Augustinian friar and written down by a mestizo scribe, addressed to the departing governor Lope García de Castro for presentation to Philip II. He was five or so at the time he was born into these events and was not at Cajamarca; his account is a ruler's political document, composed to advance a claim, and it should be read as one.

His version of the square is this: *los mataron a todos con los caballos, con espadas, con arcabuces, como quien mata a ouejas, sin hacerles naidie resistencia, que no se escaparon de más de diez mill, doçientos* — they killed them all with the horses, with swords, with arquebuses, like one who kills sheep, without anyone offering them resistance, so that of more than ten thousand, two hundred escaped. He also explains why they were unarmed, and the explanation is not that they were ambushed but that they had not thought it necessary: his uncle went down to Cajamarca *no con armas para pelear, ni arneses para se deffender, sino con tomes y lazos* — not with weapons for fighting, nor harness to defend himself, but with knives and lassoes, the tools for taking and butchering llamas, because that was what they took the horses to be. *No haciendo casso de tan poca jente* — making nothing of so few men.

Set the two documents beside each other. Xerez: no Indian raised arms against a Spaniard. Titu Cusi: they killed them like a man killing sheep, and nobody resisted. On the central fact the conqueror's official account and the conquered ruler's petition agree exactly, and it is not a fact about courage. It is a fact about what each party thought was happening in the hour before it happened.

What the force actually was

The instrument that did this was not an army in any sense a European state would have recognised. It was a private venture operating under a licence.

The men who shared Atahualpa's ransom numbered a hundred and sixty-eight, and because they shared a treasure they had to be listed, which is why they are the best-documented conquering force in the sixteenth century; James Lockhart's reconstruction of the group finds them a fair sample of Spaniards then in the Indies rather than professional soldiers — roughly a third claiming hidalgo status and nearly all the rest commoners, most of them literate, drawn from a range of trades. They had no wages. They had shares. Xerez gives the arithmetic of the distribution when the ransom was melted down and weighed at Cajamarca, finished on St James's Day 1533: *un cuento y trecientos y veinte y seis mil y quinientos y treinta y nueve pesos de buen oro* — 1,326,539 pesos of good gold, plus 51,610 marks of silver, from which the royal fifth was taken after the smelter's fees. What remained

the Governor divided among *todos los conquistadores que lo ganaron*, the conquerors who had won it, and the rates were fixed by whether a man had a horse: *los de á caballo á ocho mil y ochocientos y ochenta pesos de oro y á trecientos y sesenta y dos marcos de plata, y los de pié á cuatro mil y cuatrocientos y cuarenta pesos y á ciento y ochenta y un marcos de plata* — horsemen 8,880 pesos of gold and 362 marks of silver, footmen exactly half, with adjustments as the Governor thought each deserved.

Three things follow from that schedule, and they run through the whole of the next forty years.

First, the horse is the unit of account. A man with a horse drew double, which is a precise statement of where the technical advantage lay: not in steel or powder alone but in mounted men on open ground against infantry with no answer to them. The prices Xerez quotes for the Peru of those months make the same point from the other end — a horse selling at 1,500 pesos, some at 3,300, the common price 2,500, and none to be had at it.

Second, the men were paid in the thing they had come to take, which means the force could not be stood down, redeployed or economised. It could only be paid by further conquest, and every man in it had a direct financial stake in there being more of it.

Third, the royal fifth. The Crown's cut was taken off the top before the division and recorded in the same document, which is what converted a robbery into a lawful enterprise: the King was a shareholder from the first melt. A licence had been issued at Toledo in 1529 to conquer at the contractor's own expense against a share of the proceeds, and the arithmetic of the ransom is that licence executing.

Atahualpa was garrotted in the square at Cajamarca in July 1533. Titu Cusi's account has the Spanish learning of a plan to attack them and moving first: *antes que los comiesen los almorzó él* — before they could eat them, he breakfasted on them.

The floor is not laid by taking the capital

Cuzco fell in November 1533 and this is where the conventional story of the conquest ends. It is also where the useful part of Module 1 begins, because holding the country took another thirty-nine years, and for most of that period the Spanish in Peru were principally a danger to each other.

The first phase was a genuine war of reconquest by the Inca. Manco Inca — installed by the Spanish as a compliant ruler, then imprisoned twice, chained by the neck, and extorted — left Cuzco under pretext of a hunt, summoned the four quarters, and besieged the city in 1536. Titu Cusi's account of his father's decision is the clearest statement in the record of what the Spanish had done to make it: he had been treated, Manco says, *prendiéndome y atándome como a perro los pies y el pescuezo* — seizing me and tying me like a dog by the feet and the neck. The general Vila Oma's reproach to him, in the same document, is the fullest

description we have of what conquest felt like at the top of the conquered elite in the first four years: they were, he says, *desposeídos de nuestras haçiendas, de nuestras muçeres, de nuestros hijos e hijas, y de nuestras chácaras, y vernos vasallos de quien no conosçemos* — dispossessed of our estates, our women, our sons and daughters, and our fields, and to see ourselves vassals of men we do not know — *tan opressos, tan ffatigados que hasta con nuestras capas nos haçen limpiar la suciedad de los caballos*, so oppressed and worn down that they make us clean the filth of the horses with our own cloaks.

The siege failed, and Titu Cusi's explanation of why is the most consequential sentence in his narrative for anyone counting the floor's real composition. The battle at the fortress above Cuzco, he says, was bloody on both sides *por la mucha çente de indios que favoresçían á los españoles* — because of the great number of Indians who favoured the Spanish — and he names them: two of his own uncles with their followings, and *chachapoyas e cañares*. Juan Pizarro was killed by a stone thrown from the fortress walls. The men who took the fortress back were mostly Andean.

That is the floor's actual composition and it has to be stated plainly: a force of a few hundred Europeans, multiplied by tens of thousands of Andean auxiliaries recruited from peoples the Inca had themselves conquered within living memory, several of whom the Inca had transplanted into Cuzco precisely so that they could not combine. The Spanish did not defeat Tawantinsuyu with a hundred and sixty-eight men. They took over one side of a war that was already being fought, and the side they took over was larger than theirs.

The conquerors' war

Manco withdrew to Vilcabamba, in the forested country beyond Cuzco, where an Inca state continued to exist for thirty-six years. And the Spanish turned on each other.

The sequence is worth laying out because its cumulative weight is the point. Almagro seized Cuzco from the Pizarro brothers in 1537 and was defeated at Las Salinas on 26 April 1538, where the Almagrist dead are given as around 120 against nine on the Pizarro side; Hernando Pizarro had him executed. Almagro's partisans assassinated Francisco Pizarro in Lima on 26 June 1541, and were broken at Chupas on 16 September 1542; Almagro's son was executed in turn. In 1542 the Crown promulgated the New Laws, restricting the encomienda, and sent Blasco Núñez Vela as first viceroy to enforce them; the encomenderos rose under Gonzalo Pizarro, expelled him from Lima in October 1544, and killed him at Añaquito outside Quito on 18 January 1546, where he was beheaded on the field. Pedro de la Gasca arrived with authority to suspend the offending laws and pardon the rebels, and at Jaquijahuana on 9 April 1548 Gonzalo Pizarro's army largely walked over to him before the fighting started; Gonzalo and his commander Carvajal were executed the next day, with a reported forty-eight others, and Gonzalo's head was sent to Lima to be nailed up.

A viceroy killed in battle by the King's own subjects; a governor assassinated in his own hall; three of the conquest's leading captains executed by other Spaniards. Meanwhile Manco Inca was murdered at Vilcabamba in 1544 — by Almagrist fugitives to whom he had given shelter, hoping to buy their way back into royal favour. The last independent Inca was killed by Spanish refugees from a Spanish civil war, having sheltered them.

The framework holds that the unsolved problem in any order sits inside the hierarchy rather than beneath it, and that the capacity which makes a man useful to a centre is the capacity that lets him replace it. Peru shows that proposition operating before there is a centre to replace. What produced the sixteen years of Spanish civil war was not a defect in the conquerors' characters but the payment structure of the enterprise: a force paid in shares of what it takes, holding a country whose spoils are finite, with a distant Crown that has promised the shares and now proposes to reduce them. The revolt of 1544 is precisely a revolt against the metropole's attempt to limit what the conquerors had been promised — and it succeeded in that limited sense, because Gasca's instructions allowed him to suspend the New Laws, and he did. The King recovered his authority by conceding the point at issue.

The forty-year floor

Vilcabamba was not liquidated until a viceroy arrived with the intention and the resources to do it. Francisco de Toledo took office on 30 November 1569, spent years on a general inspection of the country, and concluded that the surviving Inca line was a standing threat because it was still venerated. Titu Cusi died in 1571; two Spanish envoys were killed on the frontier; Toledo declared war on 14 April 1572, citing the killing of ambassadors as a breach of the law observed by all nations. An expedition of some two hundred and fifty Spaniards and around two thousand Andean auxiliaries — again, the auxiliaries outnumbering the Spanish by roughly eight to one — took Vilcabamba. Túpac Amaru was brought to Cuzco and beheaded in the main square on 24 September 1572, before a compelled indigenous audience. Philip II's response, in a letter to Toledo, was that some things about the execution would have been better omitted.

Forty years, then, from the square at Cajamarca to the square at Cuzco. And Toledo did the rest of the work in the same decade: the *reducciones* that pulled a dispersed population into administered towns, the general inspection of 1570–75, the ordinances issued between 1570 and 1574, and the mining draft that fed Potosí. Much of it had precedent in earlier administrations; what Toledo did was give it legal form and enforce it. The order that would last two hundred and fifty more years was not built by the men who won at Cajamarca. It was built by a royal official who arrived after they had destroyed each other, and one of his first acts was to kill the last of the dynasty they had left alive.

Who was disarmed, and who was not

Two disarmaments run through this period and they are asymmetric.

The Crown prohibited the sale of weapons to indigenous people, a prohibition Charles V had to repeat — and the repetition is the tell, since a rule that worked would not need reissuing. The general position hardened into the compiled law of the Indies: Andeans were not to bear Spanish arms or ride horses without licence, which is the same technical fact that set the ransom shares in 1533, converted from an advantage into a legal category. But the prohibition was never absolute in practice, because the floor could not have stood without armed Andeans: the auxiliaries at Sacsahuaman and at Vilcabamba carried weapons on the Spanish side, and the exemptions granted to indigenous nobles who had served were among the rewards that bound them.

The second disarmament is the one the framework says to look for at the elite level, and in Peru it takes sixteen years and several executions. The men who conquered Peru held their positions by armed force and expected to keep them that way; the Crown's answer was not to negotiate the point but to break them in the field and then hand the country to salaried officials. What the encomendero kept after 1548 was a revenue, not a retinue. That transition — from a conquering class holding arms to a propertied class holding grants — is the settlement's business rather than the floor's, and it is where the next module has to begin.

Reading the floor against the framework

Three things in this module are confirmations of what the framework already holds, and I mark them as such rather than dressing them up. The floor is force and is laid before anything else: Cajamarca is that proposition in its least ambiguous form. A rising of the unarmed against an intact armed force loses: the men in the square had brought llama knives. And structural change comes from inside the hierarchy: the only party that ever seriously threatened Spanish control of Peru in this period was other Spaniards.

The contribution the case returns is about the *duration* of a floor's laying, and it corrects an emphasis rather than a claim. This collection's cases have tended to date the floor to a founding act — a battle, a treaty, a proclamation — and then proceed. Peru will not permit that, and the reason it will not is instructive: the founding act was cheap precisely because it was not the conquest. A hundred and sixty-eight men could take an emperor because a succession war had split the order, an epidemic had killed the previous ruler, and the subject peoples of a recent conquest were available as allies against it. Every one of those conditions is a fact about the moment rather than about the conquerors' strength — and none of them holds a country afterwards. So the cheapness of the founding act and the length of the subsequent struggle are the same fact seen twice: a floor laid by exploiting a rival's internal

fracture inherits a country in which the fracture is still running, and must then spend decades doing the work the initial victory did not do.

Stated as a proposition for the next case to test: the cheaper a conquest's founding act, the longer the floor takes to lay, because a cheap victory is evidence that the conqueror borrowed someone else's collapse instead of defeating an intact order. Where a conqueror beats an order at full strength, he has demonstrated to everyone concerned that he can; where he wins because the order was already coming apart, he has demonstrated nothing except good timing, and the demonstration still has to be made — to the conquered, and, as Peru shows at length, to his own men.

A second observation belongs here and it sharpens a discipline the framework already carries. The framework insists on asking *whose* belief is holding up a quiet floor. Peru requires the same question about the floor itself: *whose* force. The reflex account of this conquest is a hundred and sixty-eight men, and the participants encouraged it, because a miracle is a better report to send home than an alliance. But the fortress above Cuzco was retaken with Cañari and Chachapoya troops, and Vilcabamba fell to two hundred and fifty Spaniards and two thousand Andeans. A conquering force's national composition is a claim made by the conquerors, and the auxiliary is the first thing their account leaves out. Count the floor's actual manpower before accepting anyone's arithmetic about how few they were.

A note on sources. The Spanish quoted from Francisco de Xerez is taken exactly from the *Verdadera relación de la conquista del Perú*, first printed at Seville in 1534 and here used in the public-domain Madrid edition of 1891 reproducing that text; Xerez was Pizarro's secretary and an eyewitness who profited from the ransom, and his account was written at the Governor's direction for the Emperor, which is the opposite of a neutral position. The Titu Cusi material is quoted exactly from the *Instrucción al licenciado Lope García de Castro* of 1570, in Horacio Urteaga's edition of 1916, which is in the public domain; the text was dictated in Quechua, translated by the Augustinian Marcos García and written down by Martín de Pando, so what survives is at two removes from its author's language, and its author was a ruler negotiating terms with the Crown while composing it. His figure of more than ten thousand at Cajamarca and his four hundred thousand at the siege of Cuzco are his own and are not treated here as counts; casualty numbers for the day at Cajamarca are given in the sources as anything from two thousand to eight thousand or more and cannot be resolved. The ransom totals and share rates are Xerez's own figures as printed. The composition of the Cajamarca company follows James Lockhart's biographical study of the hundred and sixty-eight, paraphrased and credited. Dates for the Spanish civil wars, for Toledo's tenure and inspection, and for the Vilcabamba campaign are drawn from standard reference accounts and the casualty figures attached to Las Salinas and Jaquijahuana should be treated as approximate. The prohibition on arms to indigenous people is attested in the compiled law of the Indies and in the modern legal-historical literature on prohibited weapons in Spanish colonial law, paraphrased here; I have not consulted the compiled text directly and the operation of the rule in Peru specifically would repay more work than this module gave it. Philip II's remark on the execution of Túpac Amaru is quoted at second hand from the secondary literature and I have not seen the letter.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 2 · THE SETTLEMENT

A Grant of People

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

What was granted was not land

The instrument by which Peru was divided among its conquerors was the *encomienda*, and the first thing to establish about it is what it did not convey. It was not a grant of land. It conveyed no title to soil, no property right, and in law no jurisdiction over persons — only the right to receive tribute and labour from a named population within a stated boundary, in exchange for stated duties. Historians of the institution are firm on the point and the grant documents bear it out: what was assigned was Indians, not acres.

This is the single most important fact about the Peruvian settlement, and it inverts what the framework has come to expect from its other cases. In Kenya the instrument declared occupied land vacant; in Algeria it declared collective land partible; in Buganda it declared a thousand chiefs already in possession of estates they had never held. Each of those performs a conversion on *land*, because in each the object was ground. In Peru, for the first forty years, the object was not ground at all. There was more land than anyone could use and a population already organised to deliver a surplus off it — so the thing worth having was not the field but the claim on the household that worked it.

What the conquerors seized, then, was not property but a *stream*, and the stream already existed. Tawantinsuyu had run on labour service and on stores rendered to the state, to the sun-cult, and to the dead rulers whose estates the previous module found still being worked by their households. The Spanish did not invent a tribute system; they redirected an existing one, and the redirection is the whole of the early settlement. That is the cheapest item on the conqueror's menu — inserting yourself at the top of an apparatus that is already collecting — and it is available only because the conquered order had built one.

The duties attached, and the one that matters

An encomendero owed, in the terms of the grant: a payment to the Crown, the religious instruction of the population entrusted to him, their protection, residence in the district, and military service when required. That last item is the diagnostic one and it should be read carefully, because the framework holds that what distinguishes a durable settlement from a brittle one is not the size of the grant but what was demanded in return.

The modern colonial settlement — Buganda in 1900, Northern Nigeria under Lugard, Transjordan in the 1920s — grants land, office and salary in exchange for tax collection and political compliance, and strips the grantee's capacity for organised violence with the other hand. It buys a dependant with a title. The Peruvian settlement of the 1530s and 1540s does the opposite. It buys a man who is expected to turn out armed, because there is no other army: the encomenderos *were* the garrison, and a grant that required a man to keep horse and weapons was creating precisely the thing a Crown three months' sailing away could not control.

This is the medieval European bargain, not the modern colonial one — land or revenue for armed service, with the civil-war risk written into the same clause. The framework predicts the medieval failure mode where a co-optation leaves its grantees armed, and instructs the researcher to date the first revolt. In Peru the answer is that the revolts do not stop for sixteen years, and the largest of them, the encomendero rising of 1544–48, was a war fought by the beneficiaries of the settlement against the Crown that had granted it, over the Crown's attempt to reduce what had been granted. The settlement produced an armed class before it produced a governable one, and the Crown's first task was to break the class it had created.

Whose stream: the kuraka

No Spaniard collected tribute himself. Between the encomendero and the tributary household stood the Andean lord — *kuraka* in Quechua, *cacique* in the Caribbean word the Spanish carried everywhere — and it was he who assessed, gathered and delivered.

Under the Inca the kuraka had been the hinge of the same system: an ethnic lord whose authority ran within his own group, confirmed and used by Cuzco. Under the Spanish he kept the position and its perquisites, and gained new ones. He was recognised as a noble on European lines, entitled to the honorific *don*; his line's claim was hereditary in principle; he was exempt from the tribute he collected and from the labour draft he filled. Outside Cuzco, as the scholarship on the period puts it, the regional kurakas were the most resolute collaborators the Crown had.

Nothing about this was accidental and nothing about it was new. The Spanish had run precisely this arrangement in Iberia for four centuries with the Muslim *aljamas* under their own leaders and their own law, and had exported it to the Caribbean before Peru existed as a Spanish word. What the case adds is a specific observation about *what a co-opted intermediary is actually holding*, because the kuraka's position was double from the first day and got worse with time. His authority within his community rested on the reciprocities of Andean lordship — the lord who receives labour is the lord who feeds, houses and

redistributes. His usefulness to the Spanish rested on delivering a fixed assessment regardless. Every increase in the assessment moved him further from the first source of his authority toward the second, and by the eighteenth century the position had been hollowed out to the point that communities were forcing kurakas out of their houses and telling them to stop considering themselves caciques at all. The most consequential rising in the viceroyalty's history was led by one of them.

That is the settlement's long fault line and it is worth stating now rather than at the collapse: an intermediary who is paid in the authority he already had is being paid in a wasting asset, because the work he is paid to do is what consumes it.

The arithmetic that would not close

The settlement was made three times, and the second time is where it becomes legible as a problem in position logic rather than a story about greed.

Pizarro made the first distribution in the 1530s, to the men who had been with him. The civil wars then killed or dispossessed a good part of that generation. When Pedro de la Gasca broke Gonzalo Pizarro at Jaquijahuana in April 1548, he held a country full of armed men to whom he had promised rewards for changing sides, and the vacated encomiendas of the defeated rebels to pay them with. He went out from Cuzco on 11 July 1548 to a place called Guaynarima with the Archbishop of Lima and a notary who held the register of past grants, and finished the distribution on 14 August, providing — on the contemporary accounting — more than a million pesos in repartimiento revenues.

It was not enough, and the chronicler Agustín de Zárate stated the reason in a sentence that could serve as the framework's definition of elite overproduction: *siendo el número de la gente más de 2.500 y los repartimientos vacos 150, estaba claro que no se podía cumplir con todos y habían de quedar casi todos descontentos* — the number of men being more than 2,500 and the vacant repartimientos 150, it was clear that one could not satisfy them all and that almost all would be left discontented. Gasca subdivided grants to stretch them and reached something over two hundred recipients. The figures vary between accounts — the claimants are given as anywhere from a thousand to two and a half thousand, the encomiendas as 150 divided out to 218 — but the ratio is not in dispute and the ratio is the finding. Roughly one man in five to one man in twelve got anything.

Five years later Francisco Hernández Girón led the men who had got nothing into another rebellion. He was defeated at Pucará in 1554 and hanged in Lima.

Here is the structural point, and it is the module's central one. A conquest cannot seat its own conquerors. The force that takes a country is recruited by the promise of shares, and the promise is credible precisely because it is open-ended — every man who joins expects a portion. But the thing to be shared is finite and, in Peru's case, was already fully allocated

within a decade of Cajamarca, while the men kept arriving. Peru had roughly 365 encomiendas at the end of the sixteenth century and just over three hundred holders among some thirty-four thousand Spaniards resident by 1630: fewer than one Spaniard in a hundred was inside the settlement its conquest had been sold on. The surplus claimant is not a later development or a decadent phase. He is generated by the conquest itself, in the same act, and he arrives before the order does.

Two of the framework's cracks were therefore present in Peru from the beginning, and the Crown's answer to both was the same: break them militarily and then re-source the settlement so that it flowed from royal grant rather than from conquest, which is what Gasca and then Toledo did.

What the Crown kept: the monopolies

The settlement was never only encomiendas, and by the 1570s the encomienda was no longer the valuable part of it. The framework asks who holds the wealth monopoly and whether it can be prised apart from the violence monopoly; in Peru the answer is that the Crown methodically took the chokepoints and left the encomenderos the declining stream.

The royal fifth came first and had been running since the ransom at Cajamarca — a claim on all precious metal, taken before any division. Potosí was found in 1545: a mountain of silver that would supply, on the standard estimate, two-thirds of all the silver shipped to Spain across nearly three centuries. Then the input that made it work. In 1563 the kuraka of the Angaraes, Gonzalo Ñavincopa, showed the cinnabar deposits at Huancavelica to an encomendero named Amador de Cabrera — one of the more revealing transactions in the record, an Andean lord handing a Spaniard the mineral that would fund the empire — and Cabrera and his partners staked claims. Amalgamation was adapted to Potosí's ores in the early 1570s, and mercury became the indispensable input to the entire silver economy.

Viceroy Toledo then expropriated Huancavelica for the Crown in 1572, divesting Cabrera and his partners of their claims and contracting them back as operators at a set price, with drafted labour supplied. Cabrera resisted; his claims for privileges as discoverer were not finally extinguished until 1591, and his heirs were still petitioning for a marquisate a century later. Toledo described the linking of the two mountains as the most important marriage in the world.

Read as settlement rather than as economic history, this is precise. The Crown does not need to own the silver mines if it owns the mercury, because no silver can be refined without it: a monopoly on the input is a monopoly on the output, held at a fraction of the cost. Whoever controls Huancavelica controls Potosí, sets the price of refining, and can allocate or withhold the labour that makes either work. Add the trade monopoly running through

Seville, the licensed markets in salt and other goods, and the fact that the labour draft itself was a royal allocation, and the shape is clear. The conquerors got tribute streams from a population that was collapsing. The Crown got the metal, the input to the metal, the labour that dug it, the shipping that carried it, and a fifth of everything before the division.

And then, at last, the land

Land entered the settlement late, and it entered by a mechanism worth setting out precisely because it is the vacancy fiction assembled out of parts rather than declared outright.

Toledo's *reducciones* of the 1570s concentrated a dispersed rural population into planned towns, for administration, evangelisation and labour supply. The result — combined with a demographic collapse whose scale is among the most contested numbers in the field — was a great deal of ground that now had nobody standing on it. Twenty years later the Crown moved on exactly that ground. Philip II's decrees of 1 November 1591, issued at El Pardo, were prompted by the need to fund a fleet against corsairs, and their instruction to the viceroys was that all lands held without just and legitimate title be restored to the King, with holders admitted to *composición* — a payment that converted a defective or non-existent title into a good one.

The operative clause is the one that provides for indigenous towns, and it should be read whole, because its protective half and its dispossessing half are the same sentence: *repartiendo a los indios lo que buenamente hubieren menester para que tengan en qué labrar y hacer sus sementeras y crianzas, confirmándoles en lo que tienen de presente y dándoles de nuevo hasta lo que les fuere necesario. Toda la demás tierra esté libre y desembarazada para hacer merced y disponer de ella a mi voluntad* — allotting to the Indians what they may reasonably need, so that they have somewhere to till and make their sowings and grazings, confirming them in what they presently hold and giving them anew up to what is necessary for them. All the rest of the land is to be free and unencumbered, to make grant of and dispose of at my will.

That is a genuine protection and a general expropriation in a single clause, and it does not need to lie about anybody. It does not declare an inhabited country empty. It measures what the inhabitants *need* — after they have been moved into towns, and after the epidemics — and defines everything above that measure as royal land available for sale. The Crown had, twenty years earlier, ordered the movement that created the surplus; it now sold the surplus its own policy had produced, and the proceeds went to a navy. Between 1594 and 1595 alone the sums raised in the Peruvian inspection are estimated at over 281,000 assayed pesos.

Toledo's own instruction to his inspectors had been to tell the natives *que desde luego se les han de señalar las tierras que han de ser suyas para siempre* — that the lands which are to be theirs forever will now be marked out for them. Both statements are true at once. A boundary drawn around what you keep is also a boundary drawn around what you have ceased to hold.

Reading the settlement against the framework

The Field Manual requires three things of this module, and Peru answers all three awkwardly, which is where its value lies.

What the instrument found. Not land held as property, and not, at first, land at all. It found a tribute-and-labour obligation owed by households to a state, a sun-cult, and a set of dead rulers' estates — a relation between persons expressed as service. The encomienda did not convert that relation into a thing; it *left it a relation* and substituted a new recipient. That is why the encomienda is legally so strange: it grants no property because there was no property to grant, only an obligation whose direction had been changed. The conversion of relations into things does happen in Peru, but it happens sixty years later and to a different object, when the composición turns land into a thing the Crown can sell.

The fiction. Peru runs two, in sequence, and the sequence is the finding. The early settlement uses recognition in an unusual form — not recognising the grantee's title, as at Buganda, but recognising the *tributary obligation* as already existing and simply naming a new payee. The late settlement uses vacancy, but a manufactured rather than an asserted vacancy: the land is not called empty, it is measured against need and the remainder declared free. This is a variant the card should carry. Where the classic vacancy fiction requires a Lockean claim that unimproved land is unowned, and can be refuted by pointing at the people farming it, the measured-surplus fiction is far harder to argue with, because it concedes the inhabitants' title, quantifies their requirement, and takes only the difference — and the taker has usually arranged the concentration that produced the difference. Look for it wherever an order resettles a population and then conducts a land inspection a generation later; the resettlement is the first half of the instrument.

The consideration. Armed service, in the first settlement — the medieval clause the modern colonial grant deletes — and the case runs the predicted failure mode to the letter, with a viceroy killed by encomenderos in 1546 and the class broken in the field in 1548. What replaced it after 1548 was a revenue without a retinue, and the Crown had to fight a war to make the substitution.

The contribution this module returns, stated plainly and as one thing rather than several: the object a settlement divides is set by what the conquered order was already doing, not by what the conquerors wanted. A conquest that meets a state which taxes households will divide tax streams and leave the land alone, because the stream is the valuable thing and it arrives without administration. A conquest that meets a people without such a stream must take the ground, because the ground is all there is to take. This explains a divergence the corpus has been treating as a difference in colonial style — settler colonies taking land, tributary colonies taking revenue — as instead a difference in what the previous conquest left standing. The Spanish in Peru were not gentler than the British in Kenya; they arrived where

somebody had already built a machine for collecting from peasants, and a going machine is worth more than a title deed.

And a confirmation, marked as one. The framework holds that a settlement binds by re-sourcing the recipient's title, so that a man defends the arrangement because the arrangement is what makes his holding his. Peru confirms it from the negative side. The first Peruvian settlement did *not* re-source anybody's title — the conquerors held their grants by conquest, and knew it, and said so — and they consequently defended not the arrangement but their own claim against the arrangement, to the point of killing the King's viceroy. It was only after 1548, when every grant flowed visibly from a royal act that could be revoked, that the holders began to behave as the framework predicts. A grant is only a leash once the grantee believes the grantor can take it back, and the demonstration in Peru cost sixteen years and a great many lives, most of them Spanish.

A note on sources. Zárate's sentence on the arithmetic of Guaynarima is quoted as reproduced in the modern scholarly literature on the reparto, in Spanish, from his sixteenth-century history; I have not consulted the original edition, and the claimant figures given by different accounts range from around a thousand to two and a half thousand against 150 encomiendas subdivided among something over two hundred recipients, so the ratio rather than the count should be relied on. The clause from the royal decrees of 1 November 1591 is quoted exactly as reproduced in the scholarly editions of the cedulario and corresponds to the compiled law of the Indies, book IV, title XII; Toledo's instruction to his inspectors is quoted as reproduced in the recent literature on the general land inspection. The 1630 figures for encomiendas and encomenderos derive from the "Relación de los Feudatarios deste Reyno" as used in the published scholarship, paraphrased and credited. The legal character of the encomienda as a grant of tribute and labour rather than of land, and the debate over its relation to the later hacienda, follow the standard scholarship, paraphrased. Huancavelica's discovery date is given as 1563 or 1563–4 depending on the source; the kuraka Gonzalo Ñavincopa's role in revealing the deposits, Toledo's expropriation of 1572 and the asiento contracting arrangement are as reported in the mining historiography, paraphrased. Toledo's phrase about the marriage of the two mountains is widely reproduced but I have not traced it to a document, and it should be treated as attributed rather than verified. Sums raised by the composición in the 1590s are as estimated in the recent scholarship and are partial. Population figures are deliberately omitted here; the demographic collapse that made the "surplus" land available is real, its scale is the most contested quantity in the field, and it belongs in the extraction and accounting modules with its estimators named rather than being asserted in passing.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 3 · THE ROBE

A Secure and Quiet Harbour for Your Royal Conscience

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The claim, and the condition inside it

The Spanish claim to Peru was not a claim of conquest. It was a claim of grant, and the grant is a document: the bull *Inter caetera* of 4 May 1493, by which Alexander VI gave and assigned to Ferdinand and Isabella and their heirs, forever, all islands and mainlands found and to be found west and south of a line beyond the Azores. Everything else in the legal architecture of Spanish America — the licence issued to Pizarro at Toledo in 1529, the royal fifth taken off the ransom at Cajamarca, the encomiendas, the tribute rolls — descends from that instrument and has no other root.

A grant of that kind has a feature a conquest does not: it can be examined. And this one came with a stated purpose written into its own text. Having made the assignment, the bull commands the monarchs, *in virtue of holy obedience*, to appoint to those lands worthy, God-fearing, learned and experienced men, in order to instruct the inhabitants in the Catholic faith and train them in good morals. The territory is conveyed for the propagation of the faith.

This is the structural fact that separates Spanish America from every nineteenth-century colonial case in this collection, and it should be stated as plainly as possible. A British administration in Africa needed no belief from the governed at all: its title ran through Crown and Parliament, and if the acquisition was lawful in London it was lawful, whatever any African thought about it. The metropolitan audience was the only audience that mattered, which is why the corpus has repeatedly found the colonial robe cut for the metropole rather than for the conquered. Spain's title was different in kind, because the condition attached to it concerned the conquered's souls. The King held Peru in order to make Andeans Christian. Whether Andeans were becoming Christian was therefore not a pastoral question sitting alongside the political one; it was evidence about whether the title was good.

Which produces a robe that must be addressed to the conquered — not as a courtesy, and not to make rule cheaper, but because the conquered's belief is the performance of the condition on which the whole claim rests.

The robe read aloud

The instrument by which the claim was communicated to the people it dispossessed was the *requerimiento*, drafted around 1513 by the Council of Castile jurist Juan López de Palacios Rubios, and read — by a notary, in Spanish, often at a distance, sometimes from a ship — to populations that could not understand a word of it. It recites the creation of the world, the descent of all men from one man and one woman, the primacy of St Peter, and the donation by which one of his successors gave these islands and mainlands to the Catholic Monarchs. It then demands recognition of the Church, the Pope, and the King, and offers, if that is given, many privileges and exemptions and much good treatment.

And if not, the text does not soften anything:

Si no lo hiciéredes, o en ello dilación maliciosamente pusiéredes, certificoos que con el ayuda de Dios yo entraré poderosamente contra vosotros y vos haré guerra por todas las partes y maneras que yo pudiere, y vos sujetaré al yugo y obidiencia de la Iglesia y de Sus Altezas, y tomaré vuestras personas y de vuestras mugeres e hijos y los haré esclavos... Y protesto que las muertes y daños que dello se recrecieren sea a vuestra culpa, y no de Sus Altezas, ni mía, ni destos cavalleros que conmigo vinieron. Y de como lo digo y requiero, pido al presente escribano que me lo dé por testimonio sinado.

If you do not do it, or maliciously delay in doing it, I certify to you that with God's help I shall enter powerfully against you and make war on you in every part and manner that I can, and shall subject you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and of Their Highnesses, and shall take your persons and those of your wives and children and make them slaves... And I protest that the deaths and losses that follow from it shall be your fault, and not Their Highnesses', nor mine, nor these gentlemen's who came with me. And of how I say and require it, I ask the notary present to give it to me as signed testimony.

Two things about that closing clause are worth holding. The first is that the operative act is notarial. The document does not need to persuade; it needs to be witnessed and recorded, so that a paper exists proving the demand was made. The second is that the paper's purpose is stated in the text itself — *sea a vuestra culpa* — the assignment of fault. It is a legal instrument for transferring responsibility for deaths that have not yet occurred, executed before an audience that cannot read, so that the record will satisfy a reader in Castile.

Which tells you exactly who the audience was in 1513, and it was not the people standing in front of the notary.

The condition becomes an audit

Then the thing your framing predicts happens, and it happens harder in Peru than anywhere else in this collection: the terms of the robe become a standard the wearer can be held to, by his own people, in his own institutions.

The mechanism is precise. Because the King owned the Church in the Indies completely — presenting every bishop under the patronage bulls, from 1508 onward — the clergy in America were not a rival authority he had failed to capture. They were staff. But the doctrine they administered was the doctrine his title was conditional on, and a theologian arguing that the condition had been breached was not attacking the Crown from outside; he was auditing it from inside, in the only language the Crown's own claim was written in.

Bartolomé de las Casas, a Dominican, is the famous instance and should be read as position rather than as sainthood: a man whose order the Crown funded, arguing to the Crown that the enterprise was failing its own stated purpose, and getting acted upon. The New Laws of 1542 followed. And in April 1550 Charles V halted the conquests in the Americas and convened a panel of theologians, jurists and officials at Valladolid to hear Las Casas against Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda on whether the wars were lawful. An emperor holding uncontested force on the ground stopped, and paid for a hearing.

The deeper cut came from Salamanca and it did not spare the title at all. In lectures of 1537–39, later known as *De Indis*, the Dominican Francisco de Vitoria examined the grounds on which the Americas had been taken and struck them down one by one. The Emperor is not lord of the whole world. The Pope is not civil or temporal lord of the whole world in the proper sense of civil lordship and power — and therefore could not have given away what he did not hold. Unbelief does not deprive a man of dominion: the barbarians were true owners in public and private law, and their chiefs validly exercised jurisdiction. Refusal to convert is no ground for war or dispossession. Discovery confers no title over lands already inhabited.

This is not a moral complaint. It is a jurist demolishing the deed. And the effect, according to a Spanish official writing thirty years later, was very nearly decisive.

The admission, in a dedication to the King

The best evidence of how much damage Vitoria and Las Casas did comes from the man hired to repair it. In Cuzco on 4 March 1572, Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa completed a history of the Incas commissioned by Viceroy Francisco de Toledo, and dedicated it to Philip II. The dedication describes the problem it was written to solve, and it is remarkably candid.

Learned men, Sarmiento writes, began to make a difficulty about the right and title which the kings of Castile had over these lands; the Emperor ordered the point examined by very learned doctors, whose conclusions were indirect and doubtful, and who gave it as their

opinion that these Incas who ruled in these kingdoms of Peru *were and are the true and natural lords of that land*. This gave a handle to foreigners, catholics and heretics alike, for throwing doubt on the right the kings of Spain claim to the Indies — and, Sarmiento says, *the Emperor Don Carlos of glorious memory was on the point of abandoning them.*

That sentence is the leash, described by the man commissioned to cut it. The King's own theologians ruled against the King's title, and the King's father considered giving up Peru. Whether Charles ever seriously intended to is unrecoverable; what matters here is that a viceroy's propagandist thought it plausible enough to put in a dedication to that emperor's son.

Sarmiento then states his commission. Toledo, he says, proposes to do the King a signal service: *to give a secure and quiet harbour to your royal conscience against the tempests raised even by your own natural subjects, theologians and other literary men.* The instrument is the general inspection of the viceroyalty, in which witnesses — including, he stresses, descendants of the Incas themselves — were examined to establish *the terrible, inveterate and horrible tyranny of the Incas*. The purpose is stated without embarrassment: this *will undeceive all those in the world who think that the Incas were legitimate sovereigns, and that the curacas were natural lords of the land.*

The second robe

What Sarmiento built is a complete replacement legitimation, and its elegance is that it does not need the Pope at all.

The argument runs: the Incas were not natural lords but usurpers who seized Cuzco and everything from Quito to Chile by force of arms, *making themselves Incas without the consent or election of the natives*. The kurakas beneath them were not hereditary lords either but appointees of tyrants. Their laws and customs violated natural law. And therefore — this is the load-bearing clause — *only for this may war be made and prosecuted by the right to put a stop to the deeds of tyrants. Even if they had been true and natural lords of the soil, it would be lawful to remove them and introduce a new government, because man may rightly be punished for these sins against nature.*

Notice what has been conceded and what has been gained. The new argument concedes Vitoria's entire demolition — it does not appeal to the donation, it does not claim discovery, it does not say unbelief forfeits dominion. It grants all of that and then says the Incas may be removed anyway, as tyrants, by anyone with the power to remove them. Sarmiento even cites Vitoria in support, which is either brazen or a fair reading of the narrow just-title Vitoria did leave open, and probably both.

Read structurally, the move is this. The first robe made Spain's title depend on a grant from Rome; the second makes it depend on a fact about the conquered order. And the

second is far more robust, because a papal donation can be argued down by a theologian in Salamanca, whereas a finding of tyranny is a historical claim that the Crown's own officials can go out and manufacture evidence for — which is precisely what the general inspection of 1570–75 did, examining witnesses across the kingdom under the direction of the man who wanted the answer.

There is a further reason the argument suited Toledo specifically, and the dates make it hard to miss. Sarmiento signed the dedication in Cuzco on 4 March 1572. Toledo declared war on Vilcabamba on 14 April 1572. Túpac Amaru was beheaded in the square at Cuzco on 24 September 1572. A history proving that the Incas were tyrants whose removal was lawful was completed six months before the last Inca was executed, by order of the man who commissioned it.

Set beside that, the same dedication praising Toledo for *emancipating and freeing them from the tyrannies of their curacas* — written while the same administration was confirming those curacas in office as its tribute collectors and building a labour draft on their authority — and the shape of the thing is complete. The order that called the Incas tyrants for extracting labour by force was at that moment constructing the mita.

The robe for the conquered

Because the title's condition was conversion, the story addressed to Andeans could not be an afterthought, and it was not. It was standardised, printed, and delivered in Quechua and Aymara.

The Third Council of Lima, sitting from August 1582 to October 1583 under Archbishop Toribio de Mogrovejo with the Viceroy present on the King's behalf, ordered a catechism prepared in three languages. Antonio Ricardo printed it at Lima in 1584 as the *Doctrina christiana y catecismo para instrucción de los indios* — the first book printed in South America — followed by a confessional manual in 1585 and a volume of sermons. A grammar and dictionary of Quechua followed in 1586. The Council's norms governed the Church in Spanish South America for three centuries, and its translations of the basic prayers remain standard in Quechua today.

Three observations follow, and they run against what this collection has come to expect.

First, the conquering power standardised and printed the conquered's language in order to evangelise in it, at a moment when it was forcibly baptising Arabic-speaking Moriscos at home and would expel them within thirty years. The difference is not tolerance. It is that the Morisco was a suspected apostate, whose conversion had already been recorded, while the Andean was a new subject whose conversion had yet to be produced — and a conversion cannot be produced in a language the convert does not speak.

Second, the operation had a destructive half running simultaneously, and Module 4 will have to weigh it: the *extirpación de idolatrías*, instituted in the archbishopric of Lima in 1610 for the specific reason that by 1608 it had become clear that the missionary effort had not taken and Andeans were continuing the old cults under cover of Catholic feasts. The catechism and the huaca-smashing are the same programme's two hands.

Third, the leash operated at this level too. Preaching in Quechua required a clergy that could speak Quechua; the men most fluent were often the ones closest to the communities; and it was clergy of exactly that kind, along with the Dominicans, who supplied the metropole with the evidence that the extraction was killing the people it was supposed to be saving.

The word withdrawn

One further document belongs here because it shows the robe being adjusted at the level of vocabulary, which is where an order that governs by law does its most characteristic work.

On 13 July 1573, at the Bosque de Segovia, Philip II issued the *Ordenanzas de descubrimiento, nueva población y pacificación de las Indias* — 148 chapters regulating how new territories were to be entered. Chapter 29 reads:

Los descubrimientos no se den con título y nombre de conquistas pues habiéndose de hacer con tanta paz y caridad como deseamos no queremos que el nombre dé ocasión ni color para que se pueda hacer fuerza ni agravio a los Indios.

Discoveries are not to be granted under the title and name of conquests, since — they being made with as much peace and charity as we desire — we do not wish the name to give occasion or colour for force or injury to be done to the Indians.

The King of Spain banned the word *conquest* from his own official vocabulary, and gave as his reason that the word licenses the act. That is a genuinely sophisticated observation about how legitimating language works, made by the man whose legitimating language it was. It is also, in the year following the beheading at Cuzco and the expropriation of Huancavelica, an instruction about what things were to be called rather than about what was to be done — and the framework's discipline is to record such a change precisely: it constrained the language, not the labour, because what it monitored was whether the enterprise was proceeding lawfully, and the answer on the documents was yes.

Reading the robe against the framework

The framework holds that in a colonial order the robe is cut for the metropole, whose belief funds and mans the conquest, rather than for the conquered, whose belief the floor does not require. Peru requires that to be qualified, and the qualification is this module's contribution.

Where the metropole's own title is conditional on the conquered's belief, the robe addressed to the conquered becomes load-bearing for the metropole — and the two robes are therefore not independent. The papal donation conveyed the Indies for the propagation of the faith. That made the state of Andean souls a fact about the validity of Spanish title, which is why the Crown paid for catechisms in Quechua, why it maintained an inspectorate to hunt surviving cults for a century and a half, and why the reports of failure were so dangerous that a viceroy commissioned an entire alternative history of the country. Contrast the British colonial pattern, where legality at home settles the question and the conquered's belief is a convenience: there the two robes really are independent, and the one addressed to the conquered can be dropped without touching the title. The variable is not whether a conqueror has a religion. It is whether his title is written in terms that the conquered's conduct can falsify.

A second, sharper finding follows from the sequence Vitoria–Sarmiento, and it refines the framework's account of what happens when a robe is successfully attacked. The corpus has treated a robe under attack as a defensive problem — the other two monopolies move in to buy or silence the rival voice. Peru shows a third response that is cheaper than either and more durable than both: the apex abandons the contested claim and re-grounds the same rule on a different one. Nobody silenced Vitoria; he died in his chair at Salamanca in 1546 and his lectures were published. Nobody suppressed the finding that the Incas were natural lords. What Toledo did instead was concede it and build a title that survives the concession — the Incas may have been lords, and were tyrants, and tyrants may be removed. The rule did not change by a single tribute payment. Only the reason for it changed.

Which yields the proposition for the next case to test: a robe is not defeated by refuting it, because the floor beneath it is indifferent to which story stands on top. Refutation forces a substitution, and the substitution is generally *worse* for the conquered than what it replaced, because the discredited claim usually carried a condition — here, the duty to evangelise, which gave the conquered's advocates something to hold the Crown to — while the replacement was engineered by the party that needed it and carries only the conditions that party chose to write in. Look, after any successful attack on an order's legitimating story, for what obligation went missing in the rewrite.

A note on sources. The *requerimiento* is quoted exactly in Spanish from the widely reproduced text of the 1513 document attributed to Juan López de Palacios Rubios; several recensions circulate with minor variations in person and tense (*yo entraré* against *nosotros entraremos*), and the version used here follows the first-person recension, with the translation my own. Sarmiento de Gamboa's dedication to Philip II is quoted from Clements Markham's translation of 1907 for the Hakluyt Society, which is in the public domain; Markham's bracketed passages reflect his editorial marking of the manuscript and I have quoted only unbracketed matter in the load-bearing places, except where noted. I have not consulted the Spanish original of the *Historia Índica*, and a study relying on this passage for anything finer than its general argument should.

Chapter 29 of the Ordinances of 13 July 1573 is quoted exactly from the reproduced text of the original held in the Archivo General de Indias. *Inter caetera* is quoted in the Davenport translation of 1917, in the public domain. Vitoria's positions are given as summarised in the standard scholarly editions and in the Carnegie Endowment translation of the *relectiones*, paraphrased rather than quoted, since his lectures survive as student notes and the exact wording is not the author's; the dating of *De Indis* varies between 1532 and 1539 across the literature, and the 1537–39 range is given for the relevant lectures. The account of the Third Council of Lima's catechism, its printing by Antonio Ricardo in 1584, and the survival of its Quechua prayer translations follows the standard reference literature and the UNESCO documentation of the Lima Council manuscripts, paraphrased. The date at which the extirpation was instituted in the archbishopric of Lima, and the finding of missionary failure that preceded it, follow the scholarly literature on the campaigns and are paraphrased; that literature is divided on how far the campaigns succeeded, and the disagreement belongs in the formation module rather than here. Las Casas is used throughout as evidence of what a Dominican could say to a king and be acted upon, not as a source for what happened in the Indies.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 4 · FORMATION

Four Hundred and Seventy-Seven Bodies Taken Out of the Church

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The count

Between February 1617 and July 1618, the licentiate Hernando de Avendaño conducted an inspection for idolatry through thirty-one villages in the highlands behind Lima. The Jesuit Pablo José de Arriaga accompanied him for eighteen months and published the tally in his manual for extirpators in 1621. It is worth reproducing in his own arithmetic, because a man counting what he has destroyed is also counting what was there.

Five thousand six hundred and ninety-four persons confessed. Six hundred and seventy-nine ministers of idolatry discovered and penanced. Six hundred and three principal *huacas* taken from them. Three thousand four hundred and eighteen *conopas*, household objects of devotion. One hundred and eighty-nine *huancas*, field-stones. Six hundred and seventeen *malquis* — the preserved bodies of ancestors. Sixty-three sorcerers punished on the coast; three hundred and fifty-seven cradles burned. And, last on his list:

quatrocientos y setenta y siete cuerpos hurtados de la Iglesia — four hundred and seventy-seven bodies stolen from the church.

Not bodies found in caves. Bodies that had been buried in consecrated ground, in Christian rite, by baptised people, and then dug up again and carried out.

Eighty-five years after Cajamarca, in thirty-one villages, in eighteen months, one inspection found six hundred and seventy-nine men and women still holding office as religious specialists, and nearly five hundred families who had taken their dead back.

Why the dead, and why it was not sentiment

The Landscape of this study established what the Andean dead were: not memories but holders. A dead Inca kept his estates, his household, his servants and his voice in council; the *panacas* worked land for men who had died generations earlier. That was the apex form of a principle running the whole way down. An *ayllu*'s ancestors were its title to its ground and its water, and the descent that made a man a member of a community was traced to a body that could be visited.

So the question of where a corpse lies is not a question about funerals. It is a question about who owns the valley, who belongs to it, and who may speak for it — which is why the Spanish insisted on burial in the church and why Andeans kept undoing it.

Arriaga reports the reason they gave, and he reports it in Quechua because that is the word they used: *la causa que dan de sacallos de la Iglesia, es como ellos dizen Cuyaspa, por el amor que les tienen* — the reason they give for taking them out of the church is, as they say, *cuyaspa*, out of the love they bear them. He elaborates: they say that the dead in the church are *con mucha pena apretados con tierra*, in great distress, pressed down with earth, while in the open field they are in the air and unburied and more at rest.

He also records an incident that shows how far the two systems could be run in parallel by the same people. Shortly before the inspectors reached one village, a leading Indian and his wife had taken two of their children out of the church — they had buried them about two months apart in a vaulted tomb of slabs, which made the removal easier — carried them home, kept them two days, dressed them in new clothes, processed them through the village, and invited the whole kindred to drink at the feast. Then they put them back in the church. Arriaga had them dug up again and the vault destroyed, and drew the practical lesson for his readers: on no account allow burial in vaults.

That family had done both. Christian burial, Andean feast, Christian burial again. No one had chosen.

The offices of a life

What the Spanish held, and held completely, was not the Andean mind. It was the register.

Set out the life cycle as an administrative matter and the shape of the formation becomes visible. A child is born and is baptised, by a priest, and entered in a book. A marriage is valid if performed by that priest and recorded, and not otherwise — which determines who counts as legitimate, who inherits, and, for a noble line, whether the claim to be a kuraka can be documented. A death is registered and a burial place assigned. Between them sit confession, communion, the annual Easter obligation, and the parish's festival calendar.

None of that requires the subject to believe anything. It requires the subject to *appear*. And the appearance was compulsory, because the same parish structure carried the tribute assessment and the labour draft: the priest's book and the tribute roll described the same persons, and Toledo's resettlement of the population into planned towns in the 1570s was designed so that one man in one place could keep both.

This is the mechanism the framework should take from Peru, and it is not the one the extirpation literature draws attention to. The Church did not defeat the huacas. It took over the paperwork of being a person. A man could go up the hill to the ayllu's huaca and, as one visitation record has a woman doing, carry a rosary and a penitential discipline with him so

that anyone who saw him would read it as Christian devotion. What he could not do was be married outside the parish, or inherit outside it, or bury a child anywhere the priest was not told about, or hold office as a kuraka without a baptismal name and a documented legitimate descent.

Over one lifetime this produces performance. Over ten it produces a population for whom the Church's categories are simply the categories in which lives are lived — which is what naturalisation is, and it does not require anyone to have stopped venerating anything.

Who do you listen to

The framing question of this module — whether a man attends to the descendant of the mummy or to the Pope — turns out to have a third and a fourth term in Peru, and the Spanish answer was neither of the first two.

He did not listen to the Pope, because the Pope was not present and had no channel to him. The clergy in Peru were the King's presentees under the patronage bulls, and by 1539 papal documents required royal approval before taking effect in the Indies. The collar in the Andean village belonged to the Crown.

Nor, mostly, did he listen to a bishop. The man in the village was the *doctrinero*, the parish priest of an indigenous doctrina — very often the only Spaniard resident, holding the sacraments, the register, the school, the festival calendar, and a great deal of informal power over the tribute assessment. The formation was carried by one man per settlement, and the order's whole claim to hold Peru rested on what he did. That is an extraordinarily thin transmission line for a load-bearing belief, and it explains both halves of the record: why so many parishes produced only nominal Christianity, and why the doctrineros who *did* learn Quechua and live among their parishioners became, repeatedly, the people who reported to the metropole that the extraction was killing the population — because they were the only Spaniards who knew.

And he continued to listen to the kuraka, whom the Spanish had confirmed in office and made their tribute collector — and to the six hundred and seventy-nine ministers of the huacas in thirty-one villages, who were not the kuraka and were often, as Arriaga's questionnaire assumes throughout, known to everyone in the settlement.

So the honest answer is that a mid-colonial Andean listened to several authorities at once, in different registers, for different purposes, and this was not confusion or hypocrisy. It is what the framework says an ordinary epistemic position looks like when nobody has captured the whole field.

Taking the heir

The clearest evidence that the Spanish understood formation as a strategic problem rather than a pastoral one is what they did to the kuraka's eldest son.

Philip II ordered in 1573 and again in 1578 that seminary colleges be founded in every province of Peru for the indoctrination of the sons of curacas and other native nobles; Toledo had authorised one at Cuzco in 1575. The programme was realised under the Prince of Esquilache: the Colegio del Príncipe at the Cercado in Lima in 1618, and at Cuzco the Colegio Real de San Francisco de Borja, ordered on 16 September 1620 and founded by the Jesuits in 1621. The Cuzco college took the eldest sons of caciques as boarders, between twelve and fifteen years old, resident for seven or eight years, taught reading, writing, Christian doctrine, arithmetic and the arts thought suitable to their station.

The stated purpose, in the institution's own account of itself, is that the boys were to be taken from an early age *in order to remove them from the idolatry of their parents*.

That sentence is the module in miniature, and it is the same instrument the corpus has met before — the mission school in Buganda, the chiefs' sons at Katsina, the *devshirme* at its most extreme — but here with an unusually explicit rationale. The Crown had made the kuraka the hinge of the whole extraction. It then removed his heir for eight formative years and returned a man who wrote Spanish, argued in Spanish courts, and had been formed away from his father's household. The college at Cuzco carried the arms of Castile and León on its lintel beside its own, and the Inca *mascaypacha* on its shield: a class deliberately made into something that was neither.

The calendar, and what it absorbed

The Spanish year replaced the Inca year as the public frame in which time was counted, and the replacement was not subtle: the great Cuzco festivals of the Inca calendar gave way to a Christian cycle whose central urban spectacle was Corpus Christi, with the images of the parish saints processed through the same squares by the same corporate groups.

But the important observation is about the *form* rather than the content. Andean religion had organised itself around processions in which the ayllu carried out its sacred objects, feasted, drank, danced, and returned them; the Church offered a calendar organised around processions in which the parish carried out its images, feasted, drank, danced, and returned them, administered by lay brotherhoods that owned property and elected officers. The fit was close enough that Arriaga's colleagues repeatedly complain of it: the priests in some regions, one scholar of the period notes, permitted Andean participation in ways that let the old rituals continue with their own objects inside the new occasions.

The extirpation, then, was chasing something it had partly created. Instituted in the archbishopric of Lima in 1610 — because by 1608 it had become clear that the mission had

not taken and the old cults were continuing under cover of Catholic feasts — it hunted, for the next century and a half, a syncretism that the calendar's structure had made convenient.

What happens when it is attacked head-on

Peru also contains the case where the imposed formation was rejected outright, and it is worth naming because of what it shows about the alternative.

In the 1560s a movement the sources call *Taki Onqoy* — the dancing sickness — spread through the central highlands. Its preachers held that the huacas, destroyed by the Spanish and neglected by Andeans, had risen and were massing under Pachacamac and Titicaca to defeat the Christian God; that the sea would rise and drown the Spaniards; and that Andeans must therefore refuse Spanish food, dress, names and worship. The huacas were said to possess their followers, who danced and shook. The message was diagnostic as well as millenarian — the Spanish and their religion were making the people sick, which in a generation of epidemics was not a metaphor.

It was suppressed by the visitor Cristóbal de Albornoz in campaigns from the late 1560s. The leaders were taken to Cuzco to abjure publicly; women were confined in convents; kurakas who had taken part were fined. And one of Albornoz's assistants in the work of finding and breaking huacas was a young Andean named Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, who would spend the rest of his life writing the longest indigenous indictment of Spanish rule produced in the colonial period.

Two things follow. First, that a frontal rejection of the imposed formation was crushed within a few years by an intact floor, exactly as the framework predicts, while the undramatic version — keeping the huaca and taking the rosary up the hill — outlasted the empire. Second, that the men who did the crushing included Andeans, and one of them was the century's greatest Andean critic of the order. The line between carrier and resister does not run between populations. It runs through individuals.

The tell inside the sacrament

One passage in Arriaga deserves to stand on its own, because it describes the failure of formation at the exact point where formation is supposed to be verifiable.

Of the Andeans examined by the visitor, he writes, very few do not admit *que siempre an callado en la confessión sacramental el adorar las Huacas, y el consultar los Hechizeros, y los demás pecados de Idolatría* — that they have always kept silent in sacramental confession about worshipping the huacas, consulting the diviners, and the other sins of idolatry.

They were confessing. They were confessing everything else. The one category of act they omitted was the one that would have identified them as not being what the sacrament assumed them to be.

That is a population that has learned the institution's procedures thoroughly enough to work them, and it is the sharpest possible evidence that attendance and belief had come apart. It is also, read the other way, evidence that the institution had become the frame within which such choices were made at all — because to strategically omit a sin from confession, you must be inside a world where confession is what one does.

Reading formation against the framework

This module was, on the inherited plan, the reason the case was chosen: Spanish America as the control where colonial formation *succeeded*, against an Irish case where it failed completely, with the destruction of the rival carrier as the candidate variable. The research does not support that framing and the correction is this module's main contribution.

First: Spain did not destroy the rival carrier. It tried for a century and a half and produced the archive that proves it failed within the period. Six hundred and seventy-nine active religious specialists in thirty-one villages in 1618; an inspectorate still running visitations in the 1650s and 1660s; a woman climbing a hill to a huaca with a rosary in her hand as camouflage. Whatever explains the eventual naturalisation of Andean Catholicism, it is not that the huacas were successfully smashed in the seventeenth century.

Second, and this is the refinement the case returns: the framework's tell needs a time index. The card holds that surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took, and Peru confirms it emphatically *for the period of the surveillance* — an order that maintains an idolatry inspectorate for a hundred and fifty years is telling you exactly what it thinks its subjects believe. But the same population's descendants did eventually hold the imposed religion as their own, without experiencing it as imposed. So the tell reports the state of belief at the time; it does not predict the outcome, because the thing that eventually took was not the thing being surveilled. What took was not the doctrine's victory over the huacas. It was the Church's monopoly of the offices through which a person is born, married, made legitimate, and buried — an administrative fact that operated whatever anyone believed, and that compounded across generations while the inspectors were busy losing their war.

Stated as the proposition for the next case: formation installs through the administration of the life cycle rather than through the persuasion of the mind, and an apex that holds the registry of persons will eventually get the belief thrown in. Which is why the Peruvian and Irish outcomes diverge without either state being cleverer than the other. Britain in Ireland never held the registry: Catholic baptism, Catholic marriage and Catholic burial continued through the whole penal period in a parallel structure the state did not staff, and the state's own church was a rival institution rather than the only one in the parish. Spain in Peru held every office of the life cycle from the first generation, because there was no rival Christian

church and the pre-Christian specialists could not issue a document. The difference is not that Spain destroyed a carrier and Britain funded one. It is that Spain held the register and Britain did not — and the register, not the sermon, is what a formation runs on.

A confirmation, marked as one rather than dressed up. The framework asks what the population actually did when the order's own authority made a determination that cost nothing to ignore, as the strongest available evidence of whether formation produced conviction or performance. Peru supplies the test in its purest form: bodies buried in consecrated ground, by rite, with nobody compelling their removal — and four hundred and seventy-seven of them carried back out. That is not a population performing compliance under threat. It is a population that had weighed the two systems and, on the one question where the systems could not both be satisfied, chosen. The framework's account of formation predicts exactly this, and the number is worth having because it is a count rather than an impression.

A note on sources. Arriaga's figures, the phrase *cuyaspa*, the account of the family who exhumed and reburied their children, the description of the exhibition day, and the passage on silence in confession are quoted or closely paraphrased from the *Extirpación de la idolatría del Pirú*, printed at Lima in 1621 and used here in a public-domain reproduction of the Spanish text; the translations are my own. Arriaga is an extirpator writing a manual to justify and extend a programme he served, his figures were compiled to demonstrate both the scale of the problem and the success of the remedy, and both incentives point the same way — toward a high count. They should be read as his claim, not as an audit. The Avendaño inspection dates and the composition of the visiting party are as Arriaga gives them. The account of Taki Onqoy rests on the *informaciones* of Cristóbal de Albornoz and on Cristóbal de Molina, mediated through the modern scholarship of Millones, Duviols, Mumford and others, and is paraphrased; the movement's scale and coherence are genuinely contested, with some scholars reading it as a widespread organised apostasy and others as a construction of the visitors who reported it, and that dispute is not resolved here. Guaman Poma's service to Albornoz is attested in Albornoz's own service records and in Guaman Poma's own account, and is a fact about the man the seed rightly warns should be read as a positioned witness rather than as "the indigenous voice." The foundation dates of the caciques' colleges vary in the literature — the Cuzco viceregal order of 16 September 1620 and the Jesuit foundation of 1621 are the best attested, with an earlier Toledan authorisation of 1575 and a later cédula under Philip IV also reported — and the account of the curriculum, the ages and the term of residence follows the reference literature, paraphrased. The stated purpose of removing the boys from their parents' idolatry is as reported in that literature; I have not seen the founding provision itself. The claim about the parish register as the operative mechanism is my own reading of the material rather than a position I have found stated in these terms in the scholarship, and it should be tested against a study of actual parish registers, which this module did not do.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 5 · THE COST COLUMN

Four Reales and Eleven

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The same man, two prices

At Potosí there were two kinds of worker in the same mine, and the accounts record what each was paid.

A *mitayo* was a drafted man. His community owed the mita; he was sent under his kuraka's warrant, walked to the mountain, and was paid the official running rate, which stood at four reales a day and was still four reales decades later. A *minga* was a free wage labourer who had contracted his own labour. At the peak of production around 1600 the free rate had risen to eleven to fourteen reales a day, and it settled at about eleven or twelve — recorded at that level in 1615, in 1630, and in 1637, when the drafted man was still on four. Free labourers earned twice to three times what the drafted earned, and worked shorter hours, roughly ten until four.

Then the detail that turns a comparison into an experiment. Jeffrey Cole's work on the mita finds that by 1603 as many as six hundred of the mingas working at Potosí may in fact have been *resting mitayos* — men whose draft rotation was off, hiring themselves out in the same mountain, on the same faces, in their own weeks.

The same man. The same mine. Four reales when he had to be there, eleven or twelve when he did not.

That is the exit dial isolated to a single individual, and it is the cleanest measurement of it this collection is likely to get. The extractor was not paying for skill or for strength; he was paying for the difference between a man who could walk away and a man who could not. Everything else in this module is commentary on that gap.

The two layers, and the doors

The framing that governs this module — that Peru has two layers, Spanish and indigenous, and a mix of people rather than one stratum — is not a complication to be managed. It is the finding, because the cost column in Peru was not a single ledger but a set of ledgers sorted by legal category, and what sorted them was precisely how many doors each category had.

Set them out.

The originario — the tributary registered in his community of origin — carried the full weight: tribute in cash at a rate assessed on his village, liability to the mita in the sixteen

provinces subject to the Potosí draft, and the parish obligations that ran alongside. He was the base case, and the entire fiscal architecture assumed he stayed where the register said he was.

The forastero was the man who had left. Having quit his community of origin, he was outside its tribute assessment and outside its mita quota, and though he could be taxed where he settled, he was not the man the levy had been calculated on. This is the exit, and it was not flight into wilderness: forasteros took land as tenants on Spanish estates, worked in cities and mines, and attached themselves to other communities.

The yanacona was attached to a Spanish estate or household, and that attachment carried exemption from the mita — a status the Crown alternately tried to abolish, to tax, and to define, and which persisted because the landowners who benefited from it were the same men whose cooperation the administration needed.

The kuraka was exempt from tribute and from the draft he was responsible for filling. He paid in a different currency, which the settlement module has already described: his standing with his own people.

And on the coast, in the sugar, the vineyards and the workshops, was a population with no door at all — enslaved Africans, of whom something over ninety-five thousand to a hundred thousand were brought to Peru across the colonial period on conservative estimates, concentrated in Lima, which held an African-descended majority for much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The framework's language is that the two dials set the floor: the credibility of the force that punishes revolt, and the availability of exit. Peru ran both dials at different settings for different legal categories *within the same jurisdiction, at the same time*, which is why the study cannot be written as Spaniard against Indian without producing nonsense. A forastero and an enslaved man on a coastal hacienda were both subjects of the same viceroy in the same decade, and one of them could improve his position by walking.

The benefit column, honestly

Your framing insists there could be a benefit, and there was one, and it has to go on the page at full weight before the cost is counted.

The tributary community retained its land. This is not a small thing and it distinguishes Peru sharply from the settler cases in this corpus: the *reducción* town held title, recognised in law, defensible in court — and defended in court, constantly and often successfully, by communities that learned within a generation to litigate. The Crown maintained a general indian court and a protector of the Indians; indigenous litigants used both; the archives of the audiencias are thick with their suits.

The tributary was also, in law, a free vassal of the King and not a slave — a distinction the enslaved population of the coast could measure precisely, and did. And in the specific bargain of the mita, the drafted man was paid, badly and often in arrears, but paid; his community's obligation was assessed, written down, and therefore arguable.

Set against that: an assessed cash tribute levied on households that lived by subsistence, the labour draft, the parish obligations, the corregidor's forced sales of goods, and — the thing the ledger of an individual cannot capture — the mercury. Huancavelica killed men, and the order knew it. The mining guild there neglected to sink a ventilation shaft, and mercury dust poisoned the workers; the mine's own contemporaries wrote to the King about conditions.

So the honest formulation of the ordinary Andean's ledger is not that compliance was irrational. It is that compliance was *rational for a man who had something to lose in his community* — a share in its land, a place in its descent, a claim its ancestors underwrote — and increasingly irrational for a man who did not. Which is exactly what the record shows people concluding, in very large numbers, with their feet.

What flight was worth

The seed that handed me this case named a specific test: if the forastero exit bought nothing measurable, the framework's exit dial is wrong in both directions. It bought a great deal, and the state said so in writing.

The scale first. The proportion of forasteros in the tributary population reached, in the districts of La Paz and Chuquisaca, something in the range of fifty-six to fifty-seven per cent by the later seventeenth century. Over half. Meanwhile the Potosí draft, set by Toledo in the 1570s at around thirteen to fourteen thousand men a year, had fallen to no more than about four thousand by the end of the seventeenth century — a decline of more than seventy per cent. The viceroys' own counts of male depopulation in the mita provinces, measured against Toledo's census of 1572, run from sixty-six per cent in 1633 to eighty per cent in 1663 to forty-five per cent in the 1680s–90s. Those figures conflate death with departure and cannot be used as mortality; that is exactly what makes them evidence here, because the administration could not tell the difference either, and its problem was the same either way — the men were not there.

Then the state's attempt to shut the door, and its failure. Viceroy the Duke of La Palata, recognising that the Andeans could not be made to return, ordered a general renumbering from 1683 in which tributaries were to be listed where they actually lived, and forasteros brought into tribute and into the mita. It provoked massive protest; La Palata had to halve the obligations he had imposed; his successor the Conde de Monclova dismantled the programme. On 10 December 1692 royal officials at Potosí wrote to the King that they had abandoned even token enforcement, because *the Conde de la Monclova resolved that the*

forasteros should remain — as they always have been — exempt from the mita.

That sentence is the exit dial's reading, recorded by the officials whose revenue depended on it. Flight worked. It worked so well and at such scale that after nine years of effort the state conceded the point and wrote the concession down.

Why the door could not be shut

The interesting question is not whether exit was available but why the order could not close it, since closing it is what a state in that position wants.

Three reasons, and they are structural rather than moral.

The geography. The Andes are vertical, enormous, and full of places to be. A man who left Chucuito for the Cuzco valleys or the Bolivian lowlands was not crossing a frontier into wilderness; he was moving within an interconnected agrarian world that could absorb him.

The competition for his labour. The forastero did not vanish; he went to work for a Spanish landowner, a mine operator, a religious house. Every one of those employers had an interest in his remaining unregistered and undrafted, and they were the same local elite whose cooperation the corregidor and the priest depended on. A door that the extracting order's own beneficiaries are holding open cannot be closed by the extracting order. This is the exact inverse of the Eastern European case the framework uses as its worst-case: there the lords colluded to return one another's runaways, and serfdom deepened. In Peru the lords competed for them, and the floor rose for the men who moved.

The fiscal category was itself a bargain. The state could have refused to recognise the forastero at all. Instead it created him as a fiscal person — a man who paid a reduced tribute, proportionate to what was possible, and did not serve the mita — because a reduced payment from a man you can find is worth more than a full assessment on a man who is gone. Which is a specific and slightly uncomfortable finding: the exit was not merely tolerated but institutionalised, because institutionalising it converted an evasion into a revenue.

Where the door was shut

Set against all of that, the coastal plantation, and the contrast is the reason this module cannot be written with one column.

An enslaved African on a Peruvian coastal estate faced the dials at their opposite settings. He had no community of origin to be registered in and none to return to. He could not become a forastero, because his condition travelled with his body: a runaway was not a man who had moved but a piece of property that had been stolen from its owner, recoverable by law anywhere in the viceroyalty. The runaway settlements that did form — a group of around two hundred who left Lima in the mid-sixteenth century for the Huaura valley, the

palenques of the central coast into the eighteenth century — were hunted, and the record of them is largely the record of their suppression.

That is the framework's grim prediction realised inside the same order that was simultaneously conceding exemptions to men who had walked away from a silver mine. And the sorting between the two was legal category, assigned at birth, expressed in law, and enforced by the same courts that heard indigenous communities' successful land suits.

Two men under one viceroy, one of whom improves his position by leaving and one of whom cannot leave at all, is not a contradiction in the order. It is what the order was for.

Why the ordinary Andean did not rise

Which returns to the module's question. Why comply?

Not, on this evidence, because the belief had taken — the previous module's four hundred and seventy-seven exhumed bodies settle that for the period. Not because the benefit column was full; it was thin and getting thinner.

The answer the record supports is that the ledger came out against revolt and in favour of departure, and departure was available. A rising against an intact floor loses, and everyone in the Andes had watched it lose: Manco Inca's siege in 1536, the millenarian movement of the 1560s crushed by a single visitor and his Andean assistants, Vilcabamba extinguished in 1572. Against that, a man with a grievance had an option that cost him his ancestors' ground and his place in a descent group — a real and heavy price, which is why not everyone took it — but that did not cost him his life, and that measurably improved his terms.

Exit is the release valve, and Peru is the case where it is visible in the accounts. Where a subject can leave, he leaves instead of rising; and an order that cannot close the door will find that its extraction has been repriced without a single revolt having occurred. The mita's decline from fourteen thousand men to four thousand was not won by anybody. It was walked to.

Reading the cost column against the framework

The seed's prediction was that Peru would be the case where the exit dial works as originally written, because unlike Ireland the extractor here wanted the labour. That prediction holds, and the confirmation is unusually strong because it is quantitative: the extractor bid roughly three times as much for a man who could leave as for the same man when he could not, and conceded exemption in writing to men who had left.

The refinement the case returns concerns what exit does to the *order* rather than to the subject, and I think it is genuinely new to the corpus.

The framework treats exit as the subject's outside option — a thing he has or lacks, which sets the floor beneath his extraction. Peru shows that where exit is available at scale, the order does not simply pay more. It reorganises its fiscal categories around the flight, and in doing so converts the exit into a new and permanent stratum with its own legal standing. The forastero is not an escapee; by 1690 he is a category in the King's own registers, with a defined tribute rate and a defined exemption, defended by viceregal decision against a reforming viceroy who tried to abolish him. The evasion had been on the books for a century and had become part of the constitution.

Stated for the next case to test: a mass exit that the state cannot suppress will be institutionalised rather than defeated, because a reduced levy on a locatable man beats a full levy on an absent one — and the institutionalised exit then becomes a permanent structural feature that later reformers cannot remove. Look, in any order with substantial internal migration, for the fiscal category that names the runaway; its existence is the measure of how completely the flight succeeded, and the date it was created is the date the state gave up.

A second observation, offered as a caution rather than a contribution. The framework's exit dial assumes a single population facing a single door. Peru's four or five simultaneous legal conditions show that the dial is set per category, not per territory, and that an order can run an open door and a sealed one in the same decade under the same governor. Any study that reports "the exit dial" for a colony as a whole is averaging across strata that had nothing in common, and will describe a moderate extraction where what actually existed was a mild one and a lethal one side by side, sorted by law.

A note on sources. The Potosí wage figures — four reales as the official running rate for mitayos, eleven to fourteen reales for mingas at the 1600 peak, settling at eleven to twelve in 1615, 1630 and 1637 — derive from Peter Bakewell's *Miners of the Red Mountain* as reproduced and used in the recent real-wage literature, and are paraphrased and credited; nominal rates across a period of monetary change should be treated as indicative of the ratio rather than as a real-income series. The observation that some six hundred mingas in 1603 may have been resting mitayos is Jeffrey Cole's, paraphrased, and is his estimate rather than a count. The mita's establishment at around thirteen to fourteen thousand men and its decline to about four thousand, and the mitayo/minga proportions of roughly thirty and seventy per cent of the workforce, follow Bakewell, Cole and the recent synthesis literature, paraphrased. The forastero proportions of fifty-six to fifty-seven per cent for La Paz and Chuquisaca are Sánchez-Albornoz's, as reported in the review literature, and vary considerably by district and date; they should not be generalised to the viceroyalty. The viceroys' depopulation percentages of 1633, 1663 and the 1680s–90s are their own administrative counts measured against Toledo's census of 1572, and the modern literature regards them as seriously flawed; they are given here as evidence of the administration's perception, not as demography. The quotation from the Potosí officials of 10 December 1692 on Monclova's resolution is taken from Ann Wightman's *Indigenous Migration and Social Change*, which reproduces it in translation from the archival original; I have not seen the document. Figures for enslaved Africans imported to Peru vary from around ninety-five thousand to over a hundred thousand on conservative estimates and are contested. Contemporary population figures for the indigenous population are deliberately not given here; the decline's magnitude is the most disputed quantity in the field and belongs in

the accounting module with its estimators named.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 6 · EXTRACTION

A Tax Payable Only in Silver

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The instrument, and the clause that matters

The single most consequential decision in the fiscal history of colonial Peru is not the rate. It is the medium.

Before Viceroy Toledo's reforms of the 1570s, the tribute owed by an indigenous community reached its encomendero in whatever the district produced — goods, cloth, maize, fowl, labour, sometimes silver or gold. Assessments from the 1560s read like inventories: so many pesos, so many *fanegas* of maize, so many birds, so many pieces of coarse cloth. The obligation was denominated partly in things the household already made.

Toledo changed that. His general inspection counted every tributary male between eighteen and fifty, fixed an assessment for each *repartimiento*, and defined the obligation as an individual tax payable in currency. The scholarship on the reform is unambiguous about what followed: monetised tribute obliged Andean households, one way or another, to enter commodified relationships — to sell produce in a market, or to sell their labour for money.

Follow that from the household's side, which is where the framework insists this test be run. A family in a highland village lives by subsistence agriculture at several altitudes and holds no coin. It now owes a fixed sum of silver every year. There are exactly two places to get silver: sell something in a market the Spanish organised, or work for wages in an enterprise the Spanish owned. Both require leaving the fields and entering an economy built by the people collecting the tax.

No law compelled anyone to work in a mine. The compulsion had been moved out of the statute book and into the arithmetic of the household, where a reader in Castile could not see it. This is the mechanism the framework identified from the hut and poll taxes of nineteenth-century Africa — Kenya, Senegal, Sierra Leone — and Peru is running it in the 1570s, three centuries early, with the same logic and the same result.

And the direction it pushed the body is not in dispute, because the state also ran the labour draft that told you where to go. The tribute made you need silver; the mita told you which mountain.

Where the silver came from

Potosí was found in 1545 and was the largest single source of silver in the early modern world. Across 1545–1810 its output has been estimated at something approaching a fifth of all silver produced anywhere in the world in those 265 years; in the late sixteenth century it is credited with a majority of world production. Its ores became workable at scale only after mercury amalgamation was adapted to them in the early 1570s, which is why the mercury monopoly at Huancavelica — expropriated by Toledo for the Crown in 1572 — was the true chokepoint of the whole system.

The mercury arithmetic is worth having in numbers, because it shows the Crown taking its cut twice on the same input. Around 1600 the Crown contracted with the Huancavelica operators at about 64 pesos the hundredweight, from which the royal fifth was then deducted; transport brought the cost at Potosí to roughly 85 pesos; and it was sold on to the refiners at 102½ pesos. The state bought at a fixed price it set, taxed the sale to itself, and resold at a margin, to buyers who had no alternative supplier and no alternative process.

On the silver itself, Potosí paid the full royal fifth throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries — unlike the Mexican camps, where the effective rate slid to a tenth — so the cerro rico produced more silver than all of New Spain's camps together *and* yielded the Crown a higher rate on it. The quinto was returning more than 1.5 million pesos a year from the viceroyalty in the 1630s, and in some years the royal fifth approached a quarter of all Crown revenue.

Estimates of what ultimately reached Spain differ substantially — TePaske's figures from the tax records, generally treated as a low estimate, put registered American silver shipments at around 501 million pesos; Cross and Morineau argue for higher proportions — and smuggling was continuous and unquantifiable. The honest statement is that the sums were enormous, that the registered totals are floors rather than counts, and that the Crown took its share before anybody else took theirs.

The labour, in bodies

The mita gave the mine what the tribute could not: a guaranteed supply of the most dangerous labour at a price nobody was bidding.

Toledo set the draft in the 1570s at roughly thirteen to fourteen thousand men a year, drawn as one-seventh of the adult male tributary population of sixteen designated provinces, rotating. A drafted man walked to Potosí — often hundreds of miles, with his family and his llamas, at four thousand metres — served his term, and walked home if he could.

The proportions in the workforce are the finding. In 1603 the mitayos are given as around thirty per cent of the mining labour force and free wage labourers as around seventy. So the draft was never the bulk of the labour. What it was, was the *cheap* portion: the previous module established that the drafted man was paid four reales a day against eleven or twelve

for the free man doing the same work. The mita's function was not to staff the mountain. It was to subsidise it — a compulsory supply of underpriced labour at the point of greatest danger, without which, as the industry's own eighteenth-century advocates argued and modern scholarship broadly accepts, Potosí could not have operated on free-market terms.

That is worth stating plainly as a mechanism: the draft was a transfer from indigenous communities to mine operators, administered by the state, priced by the state, and defended by the state on the ground that the enterprise would fail without it. The men who told the King the mita must continue were telling him, correctly, that the silver depended on paying some men a third of the going rate.

Huancavelica's draft was worse, and the difference was mercury. The guild neglected to sink a ventilation shaft and the dust poisoned the workers.

The tax that raised itself

Now the mechanism I think is this module's real contribution, because it is not in the framework and it explains a great deal about the seventeenth century.

Toledo's assessment fixed each community's total obligation on the count of tributaries recorded in the 1570s inspection. The obligation was collective: the community, through its kuraka, owed the sum entered against it. And the assessment could be altered only by a new general inspection — which did not happen. The next serious attempt came in the 1680s under La Palata, and it failed and was dismantled. So for something over a century, the official figure a community owed was the figure set on its population as counted in the 1570s.

Meanwhile the population fell, catastrophically and continuously — by death and by departure, in proportions nobody could then determine and nobody can now agree on. The viceroys' own counts against Toledo's baseline reported male declines of sixty-six per cent by 1633 and eighty per cent by 1663.

Put the two facts together. A fixed collective sum, divided among a shrinking number of survivors, is an automatically escalating per-head tax that requires no decree, no new legislation, no decision by anybody, and no visible act of increase. A village assessed on two hundred tributaries in 1575 and holding sixty in 1650 owed the same total. The rate per man had more than tripled, and no official had raised it.

This changes how the whole seventeenth century reads. The standard picture is of a fixed and rather static fiscal regime punctuated by abuses. The reality is a levy whose real incidence rose relentlessly through the entire period by pure arithmetic — which explains why the pressure to flee kept increasing, why kurakas were ruined trying to make up the difference from their own resources, why the "deliveries in silver" arose in which communities paid cash instead of sending men, and why a state that had frozen its own tax base then discovered it

could not thaw it, because a new count would have meant admitting the collapse.

A tax fixed in nominal terms on a collective, in a period of demographic decline, is an escalating tax that nobody can be blamed for. Look for it in any order that assesses communities rather than individuals and then fails to re-survey.

The eighteenth-century addition: buying what you did not want

The last major extraction instrument was not a tax at all but a compulsory purchase, and its history is a precise illustration of an instrument acquiring its real purpose.

The *repartimiento de mercancías* was the corregidor's forced sale of goods to the indigenous population of his district — mules, cloth, iron, occasionally luxuries nobody in a highland village had any use for — at prices he set, on credit he extended. It existed informally from the sixteenth century and grew as the office of corregidor came to be sold. In a royal decree of 15 June 1751 the Crown legalised it, ordered juntas to fix maximum volumes and official unit prices per district, and levied a sales tax on the trade; the Peruvian schedule prepared by 1756 set a five-year total around 5.5 million pesos, with an expected yield to the treasury of a little over 200,000.

Recent scholarship argues, persuasively, that the 1751 decree was not simple corruption legalised but a Bourbon reform with an economic theory behind it: make the Indians industrious by making them consumers, generate trade, and tax the trade. Whatever the intention, the quotas were routinely ignored, corregidores sold double or triple their permitted amounts, and goods paid for were sometimes never delivered.

Read against the medium-of-payment test, the reparto is the same instrument as the monetised tribute turned around. The tribute required silver the household did not have, and drove it into the market. The reparto forced goods on the household it did not want, and left it owing silver it did not have — driving it into the same market, from the other direction. The tax created a need for cash; the forced sale created a debt in cash. Both put the same man on the same road for the same reason. And the reparto's abolition was among the central demands of the rising of 1780–83.

Sorted by category

The seed that handed me this case warned specifically against writing this module in two columns, and it was right, because in Peru the extraction was sorted by explicit legal category and the categories are the instrument.

Tribute liability was not general. It fell on *indios* and on free people of African descent. It did not fall on Spaniards. Mestizos were, in principle, outside it. And a person's category determined not only whether he paid but at what rate, with what exemptions, and whether

he could be drafted — kurakas and their legitimate heirs exempt, those serving on native councils or in the church exempt, the sick exempt, craftsmen partly exempt or permitted to pay in goods, forasteros at a reduced rate and outside the mita, yanaconas outside the mita, a widowed or single person counted as half a tributary.

This is the framework's category mechanism in its most explicit form, and the contrast with the corpus's other cases is the point. Ireland's Module 9 found a *uniform* instrument doing unequal work — one tax schedule across unequal countries, discriminating without a discriminatory statute. Peru does the opposite: it discriminates in writing, by name, on the face of the law, with the rate printed against the category.

And here is what the comparison yields, which neither case shows alone. The explicit system was more permeable than the uniform one. Because status was written down, it could be litigated, purchased, and argued into — and it was, constantly. Petitions to be recognised as forastero, as yanacona del rey, as mestizo, as a craftsman, as the descendant of a kuraka, fill the archives; a change of category was a change of tax rate, and people pursued it as such. A uniform schedule applied to unequal people leaves nothing to argue about, because there is no category to move between. An explicit hierarchy of legal statuses is a hierarchy with doors in it, and the doors are what the litigation was for. That does not make it milder. It makes it differently shaped, and it explains why the same order produced both a rigid caste vocabulary and a population that spent three centuries reclassifying itself.

Flow or stock

The Field Manual requires this module to establish which fork the extraction is on before hunting for an equilibrium, and Peru is unusually clear.

The dominant extraction was flow: tribute at a rate, labour-days at a quota, a share of metal, a margin on mercury. The producer had to stay alive and in place, which is why the order maintained community landholding, defended it in court, and panicked when populations fell. A settler order wants the native gone; this one wanted him counted, resident, and paying.

But there is a *stock* extraction running alongside it and it should not be lost: the land taken through the composición after 1591, on the measured-surplus mechanism this study's settlement module described — need assessed, remainder declared free, sold to fund a fleet. That is a taking with no rate, and no equilibrium, and it did not have to be tuned because it was finished once done.

So Peru is a tributary order with a settler-style dispossession embedded in it, on a schedule set by the demographic collapse. The two extractions were not in tension; they were sequenced. First the people are moved and counted, then they are taxed as a flow, and the ground their movement vacated is sold off as a stock.

Reading extraction against the framework

Three findings, and I mark their weight honestly.

The medium-of-payment test, confirmed at a new date. The Field Manual derives the mechanism — a tax payable only in the conqueror's currency, levied on a subsistence household, is a labour draft relocated into arithmetic — from nineteenth-century African cases, and treats the accompanying census, register and responsible headman as the apparatus such a tax generates. Peru runs the entire mechanism from the 1570s: monetised individual assessment, general inspection, resettlement into countable towns, native headman made responsible for the return. This is a confirmation rather than a contribution, and it is a strong one, because three centuries and an ocean separate the instances and neither copied the other. The card should record that the mechanism is not a nineteenth-century colonial invention but a general solution reached independently by any state that wants labour from people who have land.

One genuine addition: the frozen assessment. A collective levy fixed at a census and not revised is an escalating per-capita tax during any period of population decline, and it escalates invisibly, without a decision, in a way no one can be held responsible for and no petition can name. Peru ran that for roughly a century. The framework's account of extraction assumes the extractor turns a rate; this is a case where the rate turned itself, and where the extractor's inability to re-count — because a recount meant confessing the collapse and inviting demands for relief — locked it in place.

And one qualification the case forces on the "just enough" equilibrium. The framework holds that a rational extractor stops at the revolt threshold and eases back when he crosses it. Peru shows an order that could not ease back even when it wanted to, because the sum was fixed in a register nobody had authority to reopen, and because the collectors between the state and the household — corregidor, kuraka, encomendero — each had their own claim on the difference. Where an extraction is administered through a chain of intermediaries who are paid out of the margin, the apex loses the ability to lower the rate, because lowering it costs the intermediaries and not the apex. That, rather than any decision at Madrid, is why the reparto quotas set in 1751 were exceeded by double and triple within a decade of being printed.

A note on sources. Toledo's monetisation of tribute, the assessment by repartimiento, the age range of tributaries and the kuraka's responsibility for collection follow the recent labour-history and fiscal-history scholarship on Charcas and Peru, paraphrased and credited; the pre-Toledan mixed assessments in kind, including the Cajamarca and Guambos figures, come from the published visita literature and are illustrative of one region rather than typical of all. The Huancavelica mercury prices of around 1600 — 64 pesos the hundredweight contracted, roughly 85 delivered at Potosí, 102½ sold to refiners — are from the colonial mining historiography, paraphrased. Potosí's share of world silver production, its output series and the

estimates of what reached Spain are all contested; TePaske's figures derive from quinto and diezmo records and are generally treated as low estimates, and the alternative proportions of Cross and Morineau are noted rather than adjudicated. The quinto's yield of over 1.5 million pesos annually from the viceroyalty in the 1630s and its approach to a quarter of Crown revenue in some years are as given in the reference literature. The mita's size, its one-seventh rotation from sixteen provinces, and the mitayo/minga workforce proportions of roughly thirty and seventy per cent in 1603 follow Bakewell and Cole as reproduced in the recent synthesis. The viceregal depopulation percentages are administrative counts against Toledo's 1572 baseline and are regarded by modern demographers as seriously flawed; they are used here only as evidence of what the administration believed, and no decline figure is asserted. The 1751 decree's terms, the Peruvian schedule of about 5.5 million pesos over five years, and the argument that the reform had a developmental rationale rather than being simple legalised corruption are drawn from the recent literature on the repartos, paraphrased; that argument is a live revision of an older consensus and is presented here as contested. Tribute categories and exemptions follow the published work on colonial tribute categorisation in Peru and New Spain, paraphrased. The claim that the frozen assessment functioned as an automatic escalation is my own inference from the fixed-assessment and declining-population evidence; the components are well attested and the conclusion is mine, and it should be tested against a district-level series of assessments against counted tributaries, which this module did not construct.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 7 · INFORMATION AND SUPPRESSION

A Book That Was Safe for a Hundred and Seventy-Two Years

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The docket

The Tribunal of the Holy Office was established at Lima on 9 January 1570 and ran until 1820. It is the most feared institution in the popular image of Spanish America, and its own case record for the period surveyed by the standard studies breaks down like this: of 498 processes, 391 against Spaniards, 86 against foreigners, and 21 against mestizos, blacks and mulattos.

Indians: none. Not few. None, as a matter of jurisdiction.

In 1570 Philip II removed the indigenous population from the jurisdiction of the Holy Office. The reasoning was that they were neophytes — recently converted, imperfectly instructed, and therefore not capable of the settled obstinacy that constitutes heresy. Their religious offences were transferred to the ordinary ecclesiastical courts of the archbishops, which established separate tribunals for the purpose, variously called the Provisorato de Indios or the Tribunal de Naturales. That is the apparatus which conducted the idolatry campaigns.

Read that as an information-control fact and its shape becomes clear. In the viceroyalty of Peru the formal machinery of ideological policing pointed at the colonising population, not at the conquered. The Inquisition existed to keep Spaniards Catholic, to detect crypto-Jews among the Portuguese merchant community, to catch Lutheran sailors, and — as the literature notes explicitly — to identify foreign agents in a period of naval war. The conquered were policed by a different, less formal instrument that offered them fewer procedural protections rather than more: exemption from the Inquisition meant exemption from its rules of evidence, its right of appeal, and its bureaucratic caution, and delivery instead to a visitor with a commission from an archbishop.

The framework's expectation for a colonial order is that surveillance faces the conquered. Peru ran two surveillance systems at once, sorted by legal category, and the one with the terrifying name was aimed at the rulers.

The seam that nobody closed

The framework paper this module is built on found that in nineteenth-century European colonial orders the censor mostly faced inward, and that toward the metropole there was little concealment because little was needed — the facts travelled and did not move anything. The Irish study then narrowed the mechanism: distance was never the operative fact; the gap between the governed and the *consenting electorate* was.

Peru is the case where those two variables can be separated, because it has the ocean in full and no electorate at all until 1810. And on the evidence the seam was not merely open. It was crowded.

Consider what reached Madrid, and how.

A Dominican argued the illegality of the conquests before the Emperor, in a hearing the Emperor convened and paid for, having suspended the conquests to hold it. Las Casas at Valladolid in 1550–51 is not an exposure that slipped through; it is an exposure the apex scheduled.

A Salamanca theologian demolished the title in a university lecture course, and his conclusions circulated widely enough that a viceroy's propagandist, twenty-six years later, told the King in a printed dedication that the damage had nearly caused his father to abandon Peru.

Andean lords went to Madrid in person. The cacique principal of San Pedro Pillao travelled to the capital in 1666 to petition for the exemption of his repartimiento's Indians from the mita and personal service; the Charcas memorial indicted Toledo by name for the dispossession of the ethnic lords, the imposition of the mita and the reassessment of tribute. These are not smuggled documents. They are petitions in the ordinary form, submitted through the ordinary channels, by people the system recognised as having standing to submit them.

An Andean provincial noble wrote 1,189 pages to Philip III setting out in detail what the administration was doing to his people, in Spanish laced with Quechua, with 398 drawings — and the fact that it never arrived is a fact about a manuscript in transit, not about a censor.

So the metropolitan end of the Peruvian seam was open, without an electorate, across an ocean, for three centuries. Which forces the question the Irish correction leaves standing: if not the franchise, what held it open?

The answer is the condition inside the title. Because the Crown held the Indies for the propagation of the faith, and because it owned the entire clerical apparatus of the Indies by papal grant, it had installed a professional class whose stated function was to report on the spiritual condition of the conquered — and that condition could not be reported without reporting the material conditions producing it. The friar who wrote that his parishioners could not be instructed because they were dead or absent at the mine was not

whistleblowing. He was filing.

Stated as the correction to the corpus's account: a seam is held open by any standing institutional audience whose professional function requires it to report, whether or not that audience votes. The franchise is one such arrangement. A licence conditional on evangelisation, administered by a clergy the Crown itself appointed, is another, and it worked at a date when no franchise existed anywhere in the Spanish world.

The reform that passed, and the one that never did

But the seam being open is not the same as the information mattering, and Peru allows an unusually clean test of when it did, because two great grievances travelled the same channel to the same king and got opposite answers.

The New Laws of 1542. Las Casas and the Dominicans argued that the encomienda was destroying the indigenous population. The Crown legislated: the New Laws restricted the encomienda, prohibited new grants, and provided for existing ones to lapse. This is the metropolitan sensor firing at full strength.

The mita. Complaint against the Potosí and Huancavelica drafts was continuous from the 1570s to the 1810s. Kurakas petitioned; clergy reported; a Jesuit sent the King an account of conditions at the mercury mine; the memorials describe the draft as the cause of depopulation. Viceroys considered abolition — Monclova did, and declined. The mita was abolished in 1812, by the Cortes of Cádiz, in the middle of a French occupation, when the metropolitan state had temporarily ceased to exist in its old form.

Same seam. Same kind of complainant. Same king's council. Two hundred and forty years apart in outcome.

The difference is exactly what the framework paper predicts: the exposure threshold is a function of whose ledger the correction lands on. The New Laws' cost fell on the encomenderos — a rival power the Crown was trying to break anyway, and had to fight a war to break four years later. The reform served the apex against a faction. The mita's cost would have fallen on the silver, which paid the fifth, which in some years approached a quarter of Crown revenue. There was no faction whose defeat that reform would have accomplished, and every institution with standing to press it — including the Church, whose tithes came off the same economy — was inside the ledger it would have debited.

So Peru does not refute the empty-column finding. It sharpens it, at a date three centuries early and in an order with no public opinion of any kind: the sensor is not a conscience, it is an accounting function, and it fires when the correction can be charged to somebody else.

What the state actually policed

Which leaves the internal battle, and here the record is thick.

Entry control. The Inquisition's censorship of books in the viceroyalty ran from 1570 to 1813 as a continuous institutional function, working through the Index, port inspections and the licensing of imports. What it was policing was European heterodoxy arriving with European readers.

Production control. Printing was licensed in Lima only in 1584, three years of petitions after the press arrived, and the first book off it was the trilingual catechism ordered by the Third Council of Lima. The colony's printing capacity was created in order to produce the formation, and everything printed thereafter passed through the licence.

Interpretation control. The most sophisticated instrument was not prohibition but production: Toledo's general inspection gathered testimony across the kingdom to establish that the Incas had been tyrants, and Sarmiento's *Historia Índica* of 1572 was the result, certified before Inca descendants and dispatched to the King. Where a rival account of the past is inconvenient, the cheapest answer is not to ban it but to commission a better-documented one.

The book that became dangerous

And then the case that shows how information control actually behaves, which is the one your framing pointed at: controlling the interpretation of information already in circulation.

Garcilaso de la Vega — son of a Spanish captain and an Inca noblewoman, writing in Spain — published the first part of his *Comentarios Reales de los Incas* in 1609, with licence. It presented the Inca past as an ordered, lawful, admirable civilisation. It was read for a hundred and seventy-two years without anybody objecting. It was, in the ordinary sense, an approved book.

In 1780 José Gabriel Condorcanqui, a provincial kuraka claiming descent from the last Inca of Vilcabamba, rose in the Cuzco region under the name Túpac Amaru. He adopted Inca dress, addressed his followers in Quechua, and demanded the abolition of the mita, the reparto and the obrajes. He was executed in Cuzco's Plaza de Armas on 18 May 1781, after being made to watch the executions of his family.

The Visitor General José Antonio de Areche then issued the decrees that make this module. He prohibited theatrical performances celebrating the Inca past, ordered the confiscation and destruction of portraits of Inca ancestors, banned Inca dress, moved against the use of Quechua in favour of Spanish, ended the office of cacique in many places and replaced its holders with Spanish administrators — and banned the reading of Garcilaso's *Royal Commentaries*.

A book that had been safe since 1609 became seditious in 1781. Its content had not altered by a syllable. What had altered was that somebody had shown what could be done

with it.

Two findings follow, and they are the module's core.

First: an order does not know which information is dangerous until someone demonstrates it. Censorship is therefore structurally retrospective — it bans the thing that has already been used, which is why the ban so often arrives after the event it was meant to prevent. Areche was not preventing a rebellion; he was confiscating the vocabulary of one that had happened.

Second: the suppression targeted the carriers of memory rather than the arguments. Not a manifesto — a costume, a portrait, a play, a language, a book about the deep past, and an office. That is the correct target list if you understand that what makes a population a *public* is a shared frame in which its situation can be described, and that the frame is carried by ordinary cultural objects rather than by political texts. Areche understood the mechanism precisely. He simply could not enforce it: the decrees exceeded the state's reach, the Quechua prohibition was not achieved, and the portraits that survive today survive because the confiscation was incomplete.

And the cost of the attempt is worth naming, because it lands in the next module. Ending the cacicazgos removed the intermediary through which two centuries of tribute and labour had been collected, and replaced him with a Spanish official. An order that abolishes its own hinge because the hinge has become dangerous has told you that it no longer believes the hinge is holding — and it will find, shortly, that nothing else is either.

Reading information against the framework

The corpus's expectation for Module 7 — administrators suppressing news from reaching the metropole — is refuted here as it was refuted in the earlier cases, and refuted harder, because Peru removes the variable the Irish study identified. There was no electorate and there was an ocean, and the facts still travelled: to a scheduled hearing before an emperor, into university lectures, through kurakas petitioning in Madrid in person, into a 1,189-page manuscript addressed to a king.

The contribution: a seam is held open by any standing institutional audience professionally required to report on the governed, and a licence conditional on the conquered's spiritual condition manufactures exactly such an audience. Which yields a testable inversion for the corpus. Where a colonial title is unconditional — held by conquest, by statute, or by a treaty with another European power — the metropole appoints nobody whose job is to describe the conquered, and the seam closes by indifference rather than by censorship. Look for the reporting class the title's own conditions require. Where the title requires none, expect an empty column; where it requires one, expect a crowded seam and no better outcomes, because — and this is the Peruvian demonstration — a crowded seam

changes what gets *said*, not what gets charged. Two hundred and forty years of documented complaint about the mita produced abolition only when the metropolitan state itself collapsed.

A confirmation, marked as one: the exposure threshold is a function of whose ledger the correction lands on. The New Laws passed because their cost fell on a class the Crown wanted broken. The mita survived because its cost would have fallen on the treasury. Same channel, same evidence, same complainants, opposite results, and the variable is the accounting.

And one observation the card should carry as a caution. This collection has read the presence of a heavy surveillance apparatus as the tell of a belief that never took. Peru shows that the *name* of the apparatus tells you nothing and its docket tells you everything. The Inquisition of Lima — the most notorious body in the viceroyalty — tried Spaniards and foreigners almost exclusively, and its function was to keep the coalition orthodox and to screen for the agents of enemy powers. The apparatus aimed at the conquered had a duller name, weaker procedures and far less fame. Read the case list, not the letterhead; an order's most frightening institution is often policing its own side.

A note on sources. The breakdown of the Lima tribunal's processes by ethnic category — 391 Spaniards, 86 foreigners, 21 mestizo, black and mulatto defendants of 498 total — is as reported in the reference literature summarising the published studies of the tribunal, and covers the period those studies survey rather than the institution's whole life; it is used here for its shape rather than as a complete docket. The 1570 removal of indigenous people from Inquisition jurisdiction and their transfer to the episcopal ordinary and the Provisorato de Indios follows the standard scholarship, paraphrased; the argument that this constituted a lesser rather than a greater protection is a reading advanced in that literature and shared here. Areche's post-rebellion decrees — the prohibition of Inca dress and theatrical performance, the destruction of ancestral portraits, the pressure against Quechua, the ban on Garcilaso's *Comentarios Reales* and the suppression of the cacicazgos — are as described in the recent scholarship on the rebellion, principally Charles Walker's work as summarised in the review literature and the work of Cohen-Aponte on the visual campaign; they are paraphrased rather than quoted, and I have not seen the decrees themselves. Their poor enforcement is emphasised in that same literature. The kuraka petitions to Madrid, including the 1666 journey of Don Diego Sánchez Macario, and the Charcas memorial's indictment of Toledo are drawn from the published work on Andean writers and petitioners, paraphrased. The date of the Lima printing licence and the identity of the first book printed are as established in Module 3. Casualty figures for the rebellion of 1780–83 vary widely across sources and none is asserted here; they belong in the accounting module. The claim that the mita's survival and the New Laws' passage are explained by the incidence of the correction is my own application of the corpus's exposure-threshold finding, and the counter-reading — that the New Laws were also substantially walked back after the encomenderos rebelled, which they were — is taken up in the modules on the settlement and on change.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 8 · ELITE COORDINATION AND THE DEFAULT

The Office That Was Sold

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The rules, before they were sold

Begin with what the Crown built, because it was carefully designed and it is recognisably an answer to the problem of capable men who might replace the centre.

A viceroy of Peru was appointed from Spain for a term. The judges of the audiencia — the oidores, the alcaldes del crimen, the fiscales — were university-trained lawyers, typically peninsular, appointed from Madrid by the Council of the Indies. And they were fenced about with prohibitions whose logic is unmistakable: an oidor was forbidden to own property in his district, to run a business, to hold an encomienda, to trade, to receive gifts, to attend weddings or social functions in his jurisdiction, and to marry within it. At the end of his term he faced *residencia* — a formal inquiry into his conduct in office, open to complaint from anyone he had governed.

Read that list as a whole and it is a single instruction: do not let the official acquire local interests. No land, no business, no marriage, no dinner invitations. The Crown was not worried that its judges would be corrupt in the petty sense; it was worried that they would become Peruvians — that a man administering a rich province for eight years would marry into it, invest in it, and end by representing it against the Crown that sent him.

Classified against the Menu, this is Rotate, by merit: recruit trained men from outside the local population, move them before competence calcifies into a power base, and audit them on exit. It is the same family as the Chinese examination system with its law of avoidance barring an official from his home district — and Peru is a strong instance of it, because the Crown had watched the alternative fail catastrophically. The encomenderos of the 1540s were exactly what happens when a conquering elite is left with local land, local dependants and local arms: they killed a viceroy in the field. The rotation machinery was built by men who had seen that happen and did not intend to see it twice.

The audit, link by link

Now run the chain, asking at each link the only question that matters: *does this man, in defending his own position, thereby defend the whole arrangement?*

The Crown. Yes, unambiguously. The royal fifth on Potosí silver approached a quarter of total Crown revenue in some years and exceeded 1.5 million pesos annually from the viceroyalty in the 1630s; the mercury monopoly at Huancavelica controlled the input on

which the silver depended. Madrid defended the arrangement because the arrangement was the treasury.

The viceroy. Yes. A grandee on a fixed term with a residencia at the end of it, whose reputation and future depended on remittances arriving and the peace holding. His interest was in the machine running, not in owning any part of it.

The audiencia judge. Yes, while the prohibitions held — and this is the link that changes, and the change is the module.

The corregidor. Here the answer is *yes, and in a way that damages the arrangement*. The district governor collected tribute, organised the mita, and administered justice, and his income came substantially from the forced sale of goods to the population he governed. He defended the order because the order gave him a monopoly market of captive purchasers. But his defence of his own position consisted of extracting beyond what the order had authorised, which pushed the base toward exactly the rising the whole structure existed to prevent.

The encomendero, after 1548. Yes, and diminishingly. His grant now flowed visibly from a royal act that could be revoked, which is what converted the class from rebels into dependants. But the stream was shrinking with the population, and by 1630 just over three hundred men held encomiendas among some thirty-four thousand resident Spaniards. A dwindling minority defending a dwindling asset.

The mine operator and the merchant. Emphatically yes. The azoguero at Potosí depended on the mita for underpriced labour and on the Crown's mercury at the Crown's price; the Lima consulado merchants depended on the trade monopoly. Both were defending a privilege the state alone could grant, which is the tightest possible binding.

The Church. Yes, and doubly, because the tithes came off the same economy and because the Crown appointed every bishop. The clergy were the arrangement's staff, not its rivals — which is precisely why their criticism, when it came, was auditing rather than opposition.

The kuraka. Yes at first, and progressively less. He was exempt from tribute and from the draft, held recognised noble status and the honorific *don*, and his line's claim was hereditary — real benefits, defended by real litigation. But his authority within his community rested on Andean reciprocity, and his usefulness to the Spanish rested on delivering a fixed assessment from a shrinking population. The office consumed the standing that made it work. By 1780 the most dangerous man in Peru was one of them.

The creole. And here is the weak link, which is at the top of the chain rather than the bottom.

The Crown sells the mechanism

The rotation machinery worked as designed for roughly a century. Then the Crown ran short of money, and sold it.

The sequence is dated and traceable. Fiscal offices in the treasury of the Indies began to be sold systematically in the 1630s under Olivares, in a campaign of unprecedented scale. Corregimientos were added to the list of saleable offices in 1678. Audiencia judgeships began to be sold systematically in 1687. Philip V, on taking the throne in 1700, sold appointments as oidor, alcalde del crimen and fiscal directly; by 1750 he and Ferdinand VI had sold about a quarter of all such appointments, raising over a million pesos for the treasury.

Now trace what that did to the chain, because two distinct things happened and both matter.

First, it converted the official into a proprietor. A man who has *bought* an office has invested capital and must recoup it within his term. Every prohibition in the rotation design assumed an official with no financial stake in his own district; purchase installs the stake at the point of appointment. This is the mechanism that made the *repartimiento de mercancías* structural rather than incidental — a corregidor who had paid for his corregimiento had to sell goods at inflated prices to Andean villagers, because that was the return on his purchase, and the Crown had taken the purchase price. The forced sales that provoked the greatest rising in the viceroyalty's history were the amortisation schedule on offices the Crown had sold.

Second, it let the creoles in. Purchase was open to Spaniards born in America, and they bought. Creoles entered the audiencias in numbers through the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, to the point that the historiography describes the Audiencia of Lima in that period as creole-dominated — a colonial establishment.

That second consequence is the one the framework should sit up for, because for about seventy years it accidentally produced the strongest possible version of the default. The most capable, wealthiest and best-connected men born in Peru now held the senior judicial offices of Peru. They had bought them; the purchase was legal; the tenure was for life or the King's pleasure; and their families' land, mines and marriages were in the country they judged. Every one of them, defending his own position, defended the arrangement — and the arrangement now included him at its top. A settlement is at its most stable not when the local elite is excluded and pacified, but when it has paid cash for a seat in the apparatus.

And then takes it back

The Bourbon reform reversed it. From the middle of the eighteenth century the Crown stopped selling, resumed appointing, and appointed peninsulars; the transformation of the Audiencia of Lima from creole to peninsular is documented in the prosopographical literature, and the expansion of the courts in 1776 accelerated it. Creoles noticed, and their complaint — as the scholarship is careful to state — was not a demand for something new but a demand to be restored to an access they had recently enjoyed.

Set that beside the rest of the Bourbon programme in Peru and the picture is complete. The reparto legalised in 1751 and then abolished after 1780. The intendancy system replacing the corregidores. The Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata created in 1776, detaching Upper Peru and Potosí from Lima. Tax increases and tighter customs. Areche's visita, with the powers to prosecute a viceroy — which he used. And after 1781, the abolition of the cacicazgos, which removed the indigenous intermediary the whole extraction had run on.

Within roughly thirty years the Crown removed or damaged the position of every intermediate group in its own chain: the corregidor, the kuraka, the creole officeholder, and the Lima merchant whose monopoly the new commercial arrangements cut. It did this for good fiscal reasons — the reforms raised revenue, and raised it substantially. But read against your framing, the arithmetic is stark. An order holds by default when each man defending his own position thereby defends the whole. The Bourbon reforms went through the chain link by link and, at each one, reduced what the man in that link was defending.

Nobody in Madrid intended to unbind the colony. They intended to collect more, and they did. The default was dismantled by an efficiency drive, one office at a time, by administrators who thought they were repairing it.

What kind of coordination this was

Two observations about the mechanism, before the classification.

It required no cabal, and there was none. The azoguero at Potosí who needed cheap mercury, the Lima merchant who needed the fleet monopoly, the corregidor who needed a captive market, the friar who needed a parish, the kuraka who needed his exemption, and the judge who had bought his seat did not meet, did not like one another, and litigated against one another constantly. The archives of the audiencias are a record of the arrangement's beneficiaries suing the arrangement's other beneficiaries. What held is that every one of those suits was conducted *inside* the framework, in the courts the framework provided, over the allocation of privileges the framework alone could grant. Litigation among beneficiaries is not a sign that a default is weak. It is what a working default looks like from the inside, because a man who is suing over his share of an arrangement has conceded the arrangement.

And the coordination that did assemble consciously, assembled against threat. The encomenderos organised in 1544 when the New Laws threatened the encomienda. The forasteros' protectors organised in the 1680s when La Palata threatened the exemption. The creoles organised in the eighteenth century when the appointments stopped. In each case a settled default became an explicit coalition at the moment somebody proposed to reprice a position — which is the framework's account exactly, and worth stating because it explains why a conspiracy appears in the record only ever *after* a reform is announced.

Classification, and the chair

Peru is a blend, and naming the blend precisely is more useful than forcing one label.

At the level of the conquered population: Assume the chair. The Spanish did not invent an intermediary; they occupied the seat the Inca had already built. The kuraka was a functioning office with an existing warrant, and a stranger could sit above it. This is the cheapest item on the Menu and Peru drew it, which is much of why a few thousand Spaniards could tax millions of people across an enormous and vertical territory.

And it carries the liability the card predicts. The kuraka's authority came from reciprocity — the lord who receives labour is the lord who feeds and redistributes. The Spanish took the right to demand and could not take the duty to reciprocate, so the office hollowed from the first generation. The card says to expect an assumed chair to drift toward Co-opt as the warrant erodes, and Peru drifts exactly that way: exemptions, the honorific, noble recognition, the college at Cuzco, hereditary confirmation — a growing pile of payments for something the office had once commanded for free. And the card says the bill is presented by the people underneath. In 1780 it was presented by a kuraka *and* the people underneath, together, which the card does not quite predict and Module 10 will have to weigh.

At the level of the coordinating class: Rotate, corroded by sale. This is the classification I want on the record, because the corrosion has a documented mechanism and a date. The Ottoman prevention machine held about two centuries before its anti-hereditary devices decayed into the hereditary class they were built to prevent. Peru's rotation machine held about a century and then decayed by a different route — not drift, but deliberate sale by the apex that built it, for cash, to meet war expenditure.

That is a distinct failure mode and I think the card should carry it. The Ottoman corrosion was entropy: rules eroding because nobody had an interest in enforcing them. The Peruvian corrosion was a transaction: the Crown converted its own control mechanism into a revenue stream and spent the proceeds. An apex short of money will sell the instrument that solves its open problem, because that instrument is the most valuable thing it owns and the only buyers are precisely the men it was designed to exclude.

Reading the default against the framework

The contribution. Where a state solves the open problem by rotating salaried outsiders and then sells those offices to raise money, it has not merely weakened the solution — it has inverted it, converting each officeholder into a proprietor who must extract from his district to recoup his purchase. The extraction is then structural rather than corrupt: it is the amortisation of a debt the Crown collected. Look, in any order that sells offices, for the instrument by which the buyer recovers his price, and expect that instrument to become the order's characteristic abuse and eventually its casus belli. Peru's instrument was the reparto; the reparto's abolition was the rebels' first demand in 1780.

The second contribution, offered more tentatively because it rests on one case. The seventy years of creole purchase produced the most durable configuration the viceroyalty ever had, and it was produced by accident, as a by-product of fiscal desperation. A local elite that has *bought into* the apparatus is bound more tightly than one that has been granted land, because purchase is a sunk cost the buyer chose and a title he can defend in the grantor's own courts. The framework holds that a settlement binds by re-sourcing the recipient's title. This is the sharper version: a position the beneficiary paid for is bound harder than one he was given, and the Bourbons broke the binding not by taxing the creoles but by declining to sell to them any longer. What ended the creole's stake was not an exaction. It was a door closing.

A confirmation, marked as one. The framework holds that a mature order reproduces itself through ordinary self-interest with no conspiracy required, and that explicit coordination appears only when somebody proposes to reprice a position. Peru confirms both halves cleanly: three centuries of beneficiaries suing each other inside the framework, punctuated by four moments of organised coalition — 1544, the 1680s, the 1750s–70s, 1780 — each of which begins with an announced reform and not with a grievance.

And the fault line, stated for the module that follows. The chain's weakest link in 1780 was not at the bottom. It was the creole officeholder who had recently been informed that men like him would no longer be appointed, and the kuraka who was about to be abolished. Both were groups with standing and means who had stopped benefiting. The framework says the crack opens from inside the hierarchy; Peru will show it opening in exactly the two links the Crown had just cut.

A note on sources. The restrictions on oidores — the prohibitions on property, business, encomienda, gifts, weddings, social functions and marriage within the jurisdiction, and the residencia at the end of the term — follow the reference literature summarising the *Recopilación*'s provisions, paraphrased; I have not worked from the compiled text directly, and the literature is emphatic that these rules were unevenly enforced and frequently dispensed with by royal licence, particularly for marriage. The dates for the sale of offices are as established in the specialist literature: systematic sale of treasury offices from the 1630s, corregimientos added to the saleable list in 1678, audiencia appointments sold systematically from 1687, and roughly a quarter of

audiencia appointments sold by 1750 for over a million pesos, following Burkholder and Chandler and the subsequent scholarship, paraphrased and credited. The characterisation of the eighteenth-century Audiencia of Lima as creole-dominated and its later transformation to peninsular composition follow Campbell and Burkholder respectively, as cited in that literature; the debate over whether office sale degraded administrative quality — Parry and Domínguez Ortiz against Burkholder and Chandler's revision — is live and I have not adjudicated it, taking only the uncontested fact that the sales occurred, at those dates, in those quantities. The link between office purchase and the reparto is a reading advanced in the literature on the corregidores and shared here; it is an argument about incentives rather than a documented accounting, and a study wishing to rest weight on it should work from the price series for corregimientos against reparto volumes, which this module did not do. Encomienda and Spanish population figures for 1630 are as given in the settlement module. The Menu classifications are the framework's and the blend proposed here is my own.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 9 · PLURALITY OR FORECLOSURE

Fifteen Million and Ten

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The arithmetic of a person

In 1810 the Spanish monarchy, with its king a prisoner in France and most of the peninsula under French occupation, summoned a Cortes at Cádiz and gave its American dominions representation in it. The General and Extraordinary Cortes opened on 24 September 1810 with 102 deputies present, of whom 28 spoke for American interests — men in most cases chosen from Americans already resident in Spain rather than elected in America. Eventually some 300 sat, including a substantial American contingent.

And immediately the deputies had to settle a question that had never before required an answer: how many seats did America get?

The underlying numbers made it lethal. Spain had something in the order of ten to eleven million people; the overseas provinces something in the order of fifteen to sixteen million. If representation followed population and every inhabitant counted, the American dominions outvoted Spain in the Spanish parliament. Not by a little. Permanently.

So the debate about apportionment became a debate about who was a person for the purposes of counting, and the resolution is the sharpest single fact in this study. The peninsular majority declined the American demand for proportional equality. The 1812 Constitution then conferred Spanish citizenship on the natives of Spanish territories in America, including the indigenous population — and made citizenship for those of African descent conditional, obtainable only through a special grant of naturalisation. The population most easily excluded was excluded, and it was excluded on the ground that would produce the required arithmetic.

The American position deserves the same treatment. The Quito deputy José Mejía Lequerica led the call for full equality of representation and denounced the discriminatory system as unjust; when equality was refused, he offered a compromise — equality for Indians, Americans and mestizos only, excluding those of African descent.

Both sides, therefore, arrived at the same exclusion from opposite directions. The peninsulars excluded Africans to keep America small. The creoles conceded the exclusion of Africans to make what remained of America large enough. The liberty being demanded had a floor written into it by the arithmetic of the demand, and the men demanding it drew the floor themselves.

That is Peru's answer to whether there was liberty or rhetoric, and it is neither. It is a real constitutional liberty, seriously argued, actually enacted, whose extent was determined by a

seat count.

The factional fight behind every protection

Now run the framing backwards through three centuries, because the Cádiz result is not an aberration. It is the same mechanism the whole record shows: every protection in colonial Peru can be traced to a fight between factions of the hierarchy, and none of them originates with the people they protected.

The New Laws of 1542. The most famous protective legislation in the history of the Indies restricted the encomienda, barred new grants, and provided for existing ones to lapse. The Dominicans supplied the argument and Las Casas supplied the voice. But the fight was between the Crown and a conquering class that had made itself an armed provincial nobility three thousand miles from Madrid, and the New Laws are the Crown's instrument against it. That is why they were promulgated at that moment, and it is why the encomenderos read them instantly and correctly as an attack.

And they were walked back. Gonzalo Pizarro's rising killed a viceroy; Gasca arrived authorised to suspend the offending provisions and did so. The protection survived in principle — the encomienda never became a perpetual hereditary lordship, and the Crown kept the sovereignty point it actually cared about — while the relief the indigenous population would have felt was substantially conceded away.

This is the framework's contestability finding stated in Spanish: a protection that the settlement's beneficiaries can force off the books is a measure of who holds the veto, not of who holds the right. The New Laws are simultaneously the strongest evidence that the metropolitan seam worked and the strongest evidence of what working got you.

The courts, and the litigation. Here the second half has to go on the page at full weight, because it is the case's most surprising fact and the framework must not be allowed to explain it away.

Andeans litigated, constantly, from the first generation, and won. They sued encomenderos, corregidores, priests, Spanish landholders, and each other. They appealed from the audiencia to the Council of the Indies. They travelled to Madrid. The office of protector de indios existed to represent them; legal aides were funded by a levy raised for the purpose; specialist procurators made careers of indigenous cases before the Audiencia of Lima from the 1550s. Communities used *khipus* as evidence of what had been rendered. The Huancas of the Jauja valley, close to Lima and organised for it, worked the court system for a century.

The historiographical dispute about what this amounted to is genuine and unresolved, and the study should say so rather than pick a side. One reading holds that litigation delivered real but momentary victories while deepening internal division and, in the long run, binding

communities more tightly into Spanish hegemony. Another holds that Andean communities used the courts to shape colonial law from below rather than merely to receive it — the leaders of El Cercado in Lima campaigning from 1735 to replace Spanish protectors with indigenous ones, and eventually winning.

But on the question this module asks, both readings point the same way, and the origin is what the framing predicts. The Crown gave the conquered standing in its courts because the conquered were its lever against the settlers. An indigenous community with a right of action was a permanent check on the encomendero and the corregidor, exercised at the community's expense rather than the treasury's, generating information the Crown wanted and could not otherwise obtain. The protection is real; the exercise is real; the wins are real. And it exists because a distant sovereign needed a counterweight against his own colonists.

The two republics. The formal separation of a *república de españoles* from a *república de indios* — separate jurisdiction, separate tribute, separate courts, separate towns — is the architecture within which all of this sat. It protected community land, it protected indigenous litigants from Spanish local justice, it exempted them from the Inquisition, and it foreclosed them absolutely from the offices, the university, the guilds and the political life of the other republic.

That is the framework's *foreclosure by architecture*, and the card is right that it is the more durable kind. Nobody had to be repressed. A man barred by category cannot have a political career to be ended, and there are no martyrs because there are no candidates.

Plural where, foreclosed where

The framework asks the question by location, and Peru requires the answer to be given by category as well.

Genuinely plural: the courts, remarkably so, at least in the sense that the state's own instruments could be turned against its agents and often were. The Church, in the specific and limited sense that a theologian could attack the title and a friar could report the extraction, both of them protected by holding an office the Crown had appointed them to. And the audiencia against the viceroy, a real institutional check that occasionally nullified viceregal orders.

Captured: the press, which barely existed and printed under licence. Assembly, which existed for corporate bodies — the consulado, the cabildo, the confraternity, the guild — and not otherwise. The interpreter class, held by a Church the Crown appointed entire.

Foreclosed by architecture: the whole indigenous population from the offices of the other republic; the population of African descent from very nearly everything, and finally from citizenship itself in 1812.

And here is the finding that emerges from putting Peru beside Ireland, which is the comparison this module exists to make. Ireland's counterweights were real, exercised and suspendable: a Catholic could vote after 1793, and the habeas corpus could be suspended by an Act renewed on a decadal cycle. Peru's are real, exercised, and *not suspendable in the same way* — the indigenous right of action was not withdrawn by a coercion Act, because there was no legislature in Peru to pass one and no emergency framework of that kind.

What Peru had instead was foreclosure by category rather than by suspension, and the two produce different politics. A suspendable liberty generates a cycle of agitation and repression around the suspension, and a class of political prisoners. A categorical foreclosure generates litigation about which category you belong to — which is exactly what the archives contain: three centuries of people petitioning to be reclassified as forastero, as yanacona, as mestizo, as craftsman, as noble. Where liberties are suspendable, people organise to keep them; where they are categorical, people litigate to enter them. The second is more stable for the order, because it converts a potential opposition into a queue.

The test the card sets

The framework's sharper test is not what powers an institution holds on paper but whether an opposition career is survivable, and where its members go afterwards.

Peru's answer is unusually explicit. Las Casas ended a bishop and died in Spain, having argued the illegality of the conquests before an emperor. Vitoria died in his chair at Salamanca. Guaman Poma spent his later life petitioning and was not executed. The kuraka of San Pedro Pillao travelled to Madrid in 1666 to demand relief from the mita and came home. Opposition *within the forms* was entirely survivable and sometimes rewarded.

Opposition outside them was not. Túpac Amaru II was tortured, forced to watch the executions of his family, and dismembered in the Plaza de Armas on 18 May 1781. The line is not between criticising and not criticising. It is between filing and rising.

An order that absorbs its critics into procedures has foreclosed more completely than one that jails them, because the procedure consumes the critic's life, generates a documentary record of the order's own fairness, and produces — at the end of it — a judgement. Sometimes a favourable one. A system that lets you win occasionally is far harder to leave than one that never does.

Reading liberty against the framework

The contribution, and it is the module's core. The framework holds that liberty is residue from factional conflict and never a gift, and Peru confirms it — but it adds a mechanism the corpus has not yet named, which is what happens when the residue is *representation* rather than a right.

A right can be granted to an additional group at no cost to the existing holders. A seat cannot. Where the concession being fought over is a share of a fixed body, every extension of the franchise to one group is a dilution of another's, so the fight over who is admitted becomes a fight over who is a person — and the arithmetic decides the anthropology rather than the other way round. Cádiz shows this with unusual purity because the numbers were public and lethal: fifteen or sixteen million against ten or eleven, in a chamber where seats followed heads. The exclusion of the African-descended population was not a doctrine in search of an application. It was the answer to a division sum, adopted by both sides.

Stated for the next case: where a factional fight produces a right, expect the residue to widen over time, because admitting others costs the incumbents nothing directly. Where it produces a seat, expect the residue to be capped and the definition of personhood to be adjusted until the arithmetic works. Ireland's hundred seats of six hundred and fifty-eight and Cádiz's citizenship clause are the same instrument, and the corpus now has it in two languages.

A confirmation, and I mark it as one because it is exactly what the card predicts. Contestability is a veto over the *removal* of counterweights, not their presence. The New Laws were promulgated and then forced back by the class they were aimed at, which tells you the encomenderos held the veto in 1546. The forasteros' exemption survived La Palata's attempt to remove it, which tells you their protectors held the veto in 1692. The cacicazgos did *not* survive 1781, which tells you the kurakas had lost theirs — and the module that follows will find that the order lost something with them.

And a caution about how this case will be read. The volume and success of indigenous litigation in colonial Peru is real, it is well documented, and it is the strongest argument available for the mildness of Spanish rule. It should not be discounted, and this study does not discount it. But the origin is a Crown that needed a lever against its own settlers; the arena is a court the Crown ran; the law applied is the Crown's; and the same three centuries in which Andean communities were winning land suits are the centuries in which the mita ran, the tribute was fixed against a falling population, and half the tributaries of some districts had fled. Both facts are true simultaneously and neither cancels the other. The correct description is not a benign order with abuses, nor a brutal one with a legal fig leaf. It is an order in which the conquered had genuine, exercisable, occasionally decisive access to a forum — and no access whatever to the question of whether the forum's terms should exist.

A note on sources. The Cortes of Cádiz figures — 102 deputies at the opening session on 24 September 1810 with 28 representing American interests, around 300 deputies eventually, and roughly 37 born in overseas territories among 303 — vary between sources depending on what is being counted and when, and are given here as a range rather than a count. The population figures of roughly ten to eleven million for Spain and fifteen to sixteen million overseas are as given in the reference literature and are contemporary estimates rather

than censuses. The 1812 Constitution's conferral of citizenship on indigenous Americans and its restriction of citizenship for those of African descent to a special naturalisation process is well established; the literature warns specifically against the looser claim, sometimes made, that the Constitution simply abolished the casta system, and I have followed the more careful reading. Mejía Lequerica's leadership of the equality demand and his subsequent compromise excluding those of African descent are as reported in the scholarship on the Cortes, paraphrased; I have not read the debates in the original, and a study wishing to rest weight on this should work from the *Diario de Sesiones*, which is published. The account of indigenous litigation follows the recent Andean legal-history scholarship — Honores, Charles, Puente Luna, Mumford, Graubart and others — paraphrased and credited, and the disagreement between the reading of Spalding and Stern and the more recent revisionist position is presented as unresolved because it is. The El Cercado campaign of 1735 and its outcome are as reported in that literature. The half-real legal-aid levy is best documented for New Spain's Juzgado General de Indios; the Peruvian arrangements differed in detail and I have described the function rather than asserting identity of the institutions. The New Laws sequence is as established in this study's earlier modules.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 10 · CHANGE AND COLLAPSE

An Interested Spectator

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The rising that lost

On 4 November 1780, at Tungasuca in the province of Tinta, a kuraka named José Gabriel Condorcanqui seized the corregidor Antonio de Arriaga and had him executed. He took the name Túpac Amaru II, after the Inca beheaded in Cuzco in 1572, and called for the abolition of the reparto, the mita and the obrajes. He had, before this, exhausted the lawful route — appeals to the viceroy and the audiencia for the corregidor's removal, refused.

Within months he commanded tens of thousands. He twice failed to take Cuzco. He was captured, made to watch the executions of his wife Micaela Bastidas and members of his family, and drawn and quartered in the Plaza de Armas of Cuzco on 18 May 1781. In the south the parallel Aymara rising under Túpac Katari was crushed and its leader quartered at La Paz on 14 November 1781. Diego Cristóbal Túpac Amaru, who had negotiated terms, was arrested and executed with his mother and allies at Cuzco on 19 July 1783 on the pretext that he had broken the peace.

The estimates of the dead run to around a hundred thousand indigenous and something between ten and forty thousand non-indigenous, and they are estimates rather than counts.

This is the framework's central proposition about change stated as plainly as any case in the corpus is likely to state it. The largest indigenous rising in the history of the Americas, led by a man with standing, literacy, wealth, Quechua and Spanish, dynastic legitimacy and a genuine mass following, met a functioning state apparatus and was destroyed. Nothing about its scale altered the result.

But it changed the price

And yet the order that emerged in 1784 was materially different from the order of 1779, and the changes track the rebels' demands with uncomfortable precision.

Viceroy Jáuregui reduced mita obligations and moved against the reparto in 1781. The forced sale of goods — legalised in 1751, quota-fixed, and by the late 1770s generating on some estimates up to a hundred thousand pesos a year for a single corregidor at effective interest rates the literature puts above three hundred per cent — was abolished by royal ordinance in the early 1780s. In 1784 Viceroy Teodoro de Croix abolished the office of corregidor de indios altogether, replacing it with intendants and subdelegates: salaried

officials, appointed rather than purchasing, without local ties, reporting directly to the Crown. In 1787 an audiencia was established at Cuzco, giving the southern highlands a high court of its own.

Every one of those was on Túpac Amaru's list. None of them was written by him.

That is the distinction the framework asks for and Peru supplies it cleanly. The rising did not author the settlement that followed; it altered the price of the settlement that existed. The Crown had been contemplating intendancies for decades as part of a general Bourbon programme, and the visitadores who introduced them were pursuing a metropolitan agenda of centralisation and revenue. What 1780 did was make the corregidor's continuation more expensive than his abolition. The reform arrived through the ordinary channels of Bourbon administration, in the ordinary form, drafted by officials — and it arrived because a hundred thousand people had died proving that the old arrangement now cost more than it earned.

Popular rising changes the price of a policy and thereby the calculation of those who hold the apparatus. That is cost, not authorship, and both halves are true here. The seed that set up this case flagged the possibility that Túpac Amaru might turn out to have authored part of the Bourbon response, which would have been a genuine counter-example to the framework's account of change. He did not. The response was designed in Madrid and Lima by men who had wanted most of it already.

And it foreclosed the alternative

The rising's second consequence was the one that mattered most for what came after, and it was the opposite of what its leader intended.

Túpac Amaru's coalition had included mestizos and some creoles; his early proclamations claimed to act in the King's name against corrupt officials. But as the war went on, the killing of non-Indians became systematic, and the creoles who had wavered went to the royalist side and stayed there. The suppression that followed — Areche's decrees banning Inca dress, dramas, portraits and Garciloso's book, the abolition of the cacicazgos, the executions of the surviving Inca line — was aimed at destroying the vocabulary of an indigenous political claim.

What it left behind in the minds of the Peruvian creole elite was a demonstration: that an appeal to the indigenous majority could be made, that it could raise tens of thousands, and that it did not stop where the people who started it intended.

Hold that, because it governs everything that follows.

The floor disappears

In 1808 Napoleon compelled the abdications at Bayonne, took Ferdinand VII into France as a prisoner, and put his brother on the Spanish throne. The metropolitan state of the Spanish empire ceased to function as a source of authority. Juntas formed across Spain and across America in the King's name; a regency called a Cortes at Cádiz; and for the better part of six years the empire's constitutional centre was a besieged port.

This is the framework's crack in its purest form, and it is neither fracture from within nor exhaustion but the third kind: conquest of the metropole by a rival elite, removing the floor at a stroke without a shot fired in the colony. No Peruvian did anything to bring it about. The most consequential event in the history of Spanish American independence happened in a French border town.

And here the case delivers the finding that breaks an inherited prediction.

The creoles who did not move

The seed that handed me this case carried a proposition from the Irish study — that a settler faction's capacity to separate from its metropole is inversely proportional to its dependence on the metropole's floor, and that the dependence is a demographic ratio it cannot change. The seed predicted that Peru would refute it: that the governing variable is not the ratio but whether the metropolitan floor is available at all, since Napoleon removed Spain's floor in 1808 and the creoles separated regardless.

The research does not support that, and the correction is this module's most important finding.

The floor did vanish in 1808. And the creoles of Peru did not separate. Under Viceroy José Fernando de Abascal (1806–1816) Peru became the royalist bastion of South America — not merely loyal but the base from which the counter-revolution was run, sending forces to reverse the risings in Quito, in Upper Peru, and in Chile. Abascal's successor Pezuela sustained it. Peru showed little inclination to break away, and independence came only through liberating armies from outside: San Martín landing at Pisco in September 1820 with a force of Argentines, Chileans and Peruvian exiles, declaring independence at Lima on 28 July 1821 without being able to attack the royalist armies in the interior; then Bolívar, and the victories at Junín on 6 August 1824 and at Ayacucho on 9 December 1824, won by Sucre. The last Spanish garrison in South America, at Callao, surrendered in January 1826.

The reason given in the scholarship is explicit and is the reason the framework would predict. The creole elite held a privileged if dependent position in the colonial order; and the Great Rebellion of 1780 had demonstrated that the indigenous masses could not be mobilised without threatening the creoles themselves. They feared that a war to expel the peninsulars would produce racial violence worse than 1780. As one historian's summary has it, Peru's role in the drama of Latin American independence was largely that of an interested

spectator until the final act.

So Peru is the case where the metropolitan floor was removed *completely* and the settler faction still did not separate — and it did not separate for exactly the reason the ratio proposition gives. The seed's prediction is wrong and Ireland's proposition survives.

But it needs restating, because the mechanism is not what the original formulation implied. The dependence is not on the metropole's *army*; Spain's army was not available and everyone knew it. It is on the metropole's floor as a guarantee against the settler's own subject population — and that guarantee retains its value even when the metropole cannot supply it, because what the settler is buying is not protection but the absence of an alternative sovereign whom his subjects might prefer. A Peruvian creole in 1815 could not summon a Spanish regiment. What he could do was refuse to open the question of who ruled Peru, because opening it invited an answer from four million people who had opened it once already within living memory.

Which yields the revision, stated for the corpus:

A settler faction's capacity to separate is governed by the demographic ratio, and the mechanism is not military dependence but the cost of opening the sovereignty question in front of a majority with a competing claim. Where the ratio is small, separation is cheap and can proceed even against a metropole that would fight — Rhodesia, the American colonies. Where the ratio is large, separation is expensive even against a metropole that has ceased to exist, because the act of contesting sovereignty is itself the danger. The floor's availability sets the cost of separating from the metropole; the ratio sets the cost of the argument you must have at home in order to try.

What actually ended it

If the creoles did not end Spanish Peru, what did?

The dated sequence: the metropolitan collapse of 1808 removed the source of authority; the Cortes of Cádiz and the Constitution of 1812 opened, and Ferdinand's restoration in 1814 slammed shut, the possibility of a constitutional settlement inside the monarchy — and the scholarship notes that some dismayed creoles went over to the rebels precisely because the restored king proved so reactionary; the Peruvian rising at Cuzco in 1814 was suppressed; Abascal's counter-revolutionary effort created a fiscal crisis and the wars sapped the economy, so that Pezuela could not revive the base; San Martín, having concluded that Argentine independence was not secure while Spain held Peru, crossed to Chile and then came by sea; and the viceroyalty was conquered by armies raised in other former Spanish colonies.

Read against the framework's four cracks, Peru is not a fracture, not an overbreeding, and only partly an exhaustion. It is a conquest — and the conquerors were the successor states of

the same empire. The viceroyalty fell to Spanish-speaking, Catholic, creole-led armies from Buenos Aires, Santiago and Caracas, in a war between the fragments of a monarchy whose centre had been removed by a Frenchman.

That is worth stating precisely because it explains the shape of what followed. An order overthrown by an outside power that shares its language, its religion, its law, its property arrangements and most of its personnel does not experience a social revolution. The tribute survived independence in Peru for decades. The land regime survived. The hacienda survived. Slavery survived until the 1850s. The men who governed the republic were the men who had governed the viceroyalty, minus the peninsulars.

And the intermediaries were already gone

One further link belongs here because the previous module set it up.

The order that faced 1808 had, within the preceding thirty years, damaged or removed every intermediate group in its own chain. The corregidor was abolished in 1784. The reparto was abolished. The kuraka's office was suppressed after 1781 and his replacement was a Spanish official. The creole had been squeezed out of the audiencia appointments his fathers had purchased. The Lima merchants had lost Upper Peru and Potosí to the new Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata in 1776.

Each of those reforms was defensible on its own terms and most of them raised revenue or reduced abuse. Together they meant that when the metropolitan floor vanished, the arrangement had fewer men left whose own position depended on defending it. The order did not collapse because its subjects rose. It collapsed because its centre disappeared, and it had spent the previous generation reducing the number of people who would have been ruined by that.

That the collapse still took sixteen years and two foreign armies is a measure of how much of the default survived even so.

Reading collapse against the framework

The confirmation, and it is a strong one. A rising against an intact floor loses regardless of scale, and Túpac Amaru II is the corpus's largest instance. The rebels compelled a repricing — the reparto abolished, the corregidor abolished, the mita reduced, an audiencia granted — and authored none of it, the reforms arriving through the ordinary Bourbon channels drafted by men pursuing their own programme. The framework predicted this outcome and the seed flagged the alternative in advance; the alternative did not occur.

The correction to the inheritance, stated plainly because the seed asked for it. The prediction I was handed — that Peru would show the demographic ratio to be irrelevant and the floor's availability to be everything — is refuted by the case. Spain's floor was gone from

1808 and Peru's creoles remained royalist until conquered from outside in 1824. The ratio proposition survives, with its mechanism restated: the settler's dependence is not on the metropole's soldiers but on not having to argue about sovereignty in front of a majority that has a better claim to the ground than he does.

And one addition the card should carry. The framework names four cracks — fracture, exhaustion, conquest, overbreeding — and treats conquest as arriving from a foreign elite that remakes the order at bayonet-point. Peru shows a fifth shape, or a variant of the third that behaves differently enough to deserve its own name: conquest by a successor fragment of the same order. When an empire's centre is destroyed and its provinces fight each other into independence, the conquering army shares the conquered order's language, faith, law, property regime and personnel. The political sovereignty changes completely and the social settlement changes hardly at all. Look, in any imperial dissolution, for whether the conquering force came from inside or outside the old order's culture — because that variable, not the violence of the transition, predicts how much of the settlement survives it. Peru's tribute outlived its viceroy by decades.

A note on sources. The sequence and dates of the rebellion — Arriaga's execution on 4 November 1780, Túpac Amaru II's on 18 May 1781, Túpac Katari's on 14 November 1781, Diego Cristóbal's on 19 July 1783 — are well established. Casualty figures are estimates and vary widely; the figures given here (around 100,000 indigenous and 10,000–40,000 non-indigenous) are as reported in the reference literature and should be treated as orders of magnitude. The reparto's profitability and effective interest rates are as given in the recent literature and are contested. Jáuregui's reduction of the mita, the abolition of the reparto in the early 1780s, Croix's abolition of the corregidores and the establishment of the intendancies in 1784, and the Cuzco audiencia of 1787 are as reported in the standard accounts; the number of intendancies is given variously as seven or eight and I have not resolved it. The characterisation of Peru as a royalist bastion under Abascal, the creole fear of a repetition of 1780, and the description of independence as arriving from outside follow the standard historiography and are paraphrased; the summary that Peru was "largely that of an interested spectator until the final act" is David P. Werlich's, as quoted in the reference literature. Dates for San Martín's landing, the declaration of 28 July 1821, Junín, Ayacucho and the Callao surrender are as given in the standard accounts. The argument that the Bourbon reforms had cumulatively removed the order's intermediaries before 1808 is my own, built from the datable reforms established in earlier modules; the counter-reading — that the intendancy system genuinely improved administration and that the order's persistence to 1824 shows it — is available and is partly conceded above.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 11 · THE GRIM ACCOUNTING

The Debt That Was Not Called

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Beginning with what cannot be counted

The demographic history of the Andes after 1532 is the most contested set of numbers in the field, and a study that asserts a figure has discredited itself. So begin with the disagreement, because the disagreement is the finding.

For the pre-contact Andean population, the published estimates run roughly like this. Henry Dobyns, working from a hemisphere-wide depopulation ratio, arrived at around 37.5 million. C. T. Smith, comparing Spanish census data with pre-conquest reconstructions, at a little over 12 million. Nathan Wachtel, by a similar method, at approximately 10 million. Noble David Cook, using three separate methods and stating plainly that all were limited, produced an ecological model whose ceiling — the maximum the Andean agricultural system could have supported — was 13.3 million.

The spread is a factor of three or four between serious scholars using different methods on the same evidence, and the highest figures are not widely accepted. This study does not choose among them and no argument here depends on which is right.

What the estimates do agree on, at every level, is the direction and the scale of the fall. Cook's own conservative reading implies an average decline on the order of ninety per cent between 1520 and 1630. And the regional differential is more securely established than the absolute numbers, because it comes from comparing like with like: Smith's ratio of decline between the 1520s and 1571 is around fifty-eight to one on the coast against about three and a half to one in the highlands; Cook's ratios for 1520 to 1630 are roughly sixteen to one on the coast and lower in the sierra. Depopulation ran inversely with altitude.

That differential is the single most useful fact in this module, and it is the one the extraction system did not cause. Nobody organised the Andes so that lowland populations would meet Old World pathogens at lowland temperatures and highland populations would not.

The prediction this module was built to test

The seed that set up this case carried a specific and testable inherited prediction, and it deserves to be stated at full strength before it is answered.

Ireland's accounting found that catastrophic collapse in a subsistence population is a matter of portfolio concentration rather than headcount: three million people living on one

crop of one variety, with nothing below to fall back to, and the extraction system had produced that concentration. The prediction for Peru was that Andean subsistence ran on *verticality* — John Murra's model, in which a single community holds plots at several altitudes so that failure in one ecological zone is covered by another — and that Toledo's *reducciones*, by concentrating a dispersed population into single-altitude towns sited for administrative and mining convenience, destroyed exactly that diversification. If so, the corpus would have the same finding twice from opposite directions: strong confirmation.

The research does not support it, and what it supports instead is more interesting.

Murra's vertical archipelago is real and well evidenced, built principally from the visita of Chucuito of 1567 and the Huánuco inspections — altiplano polities holding maize fields on the western flank, coca on the eastern slopes, herds on the puna, and craft settlements besides, with the "islands" of different groups crossing and overlapping. It has genuine critics: the model has been charged with adaptationism, with subsuming distinct processes under one label after Murra widened it, and with underweighting horizontal trade, which isotopic work on highland burials showing coastal marine intake supports.

But on the specific question — whether the General Resettlement destroyed it — the definitive modern study answers no. Jeremy Mumford's *Vertical Empire*, working on precisely this, finds that Toledo assigned more than a million people to some six hundred reducciones, and that the process involved negotiation between the inspectors and the Andeans to effect a resettlement that would still give the native lineages access to resources at different altitudes in various ecological niches, so that they could meet their subsistence needs. Toledo's men knew about verticality; they had commissioned the ethnographic inquiries that documented it; and the Andean lords cooperated in the resettlement in exchange for keeping their authority as officers of the new towns. Mumford's summary is that the reducciones were a short-term failure and a long-term success, and that rather than destroying the web of Andean communities the Resettlement added a layer to it.

So the inherited prediction is refuted. And the reason it is refuted is the module's central finding.

Why the extractor preserved the diversification

The Spanish left the vertical portfolio substantially intact because they were taxing the household that used it.

Follow the arithmetic from the extractor's side. The tribute was assessed on the community and fixed by census; the mita drew one in seven adult males on rotation and returned them; the whole fiscal architecture assumed a countable, resident, reproducing tributary population. A household that starves pays nothing. A community whose subsistence base collapses cannot fill its draft. The extractor's interest was in a producer who

survived bad years — and verticality was the technology by which Andean households survived bad years.

Compare Ireland directly, because the comparison is what makes this general. There the landlord's interest lay in the *land*, not in the tenant's labour: consolidation for grazing was more profitable than the tenant, so the tenant was squeezed onto a smaller and smaller plot of the one crop that could feed a family on it. The portfolio collapsed to a monoculture because the extractor did not need the producer.

Same variable, opposite settings, opposite outcomes:

Where the extractor wants the producer's labour, he preserves the producer's subsistence portfolio. Where he wants the producer's land, he destroys it. The metabolic debt is therefore not a general consequence of conquest at all. It is a consequence of the *extraction fork* — the same fork the framework already names between extraction-as-rate and extraction-as-dispossession — running through the household's food supply. The corpus does get the same finding twice from opposite directions, but the variable is not verticality. It is whether the man taking the surplus needs the man producing it.

And this joins the finding from the cost column, where the extractor bid three times as much for a worker who could leave. It is the same fact seen twice: an order that needs its subjects alive behaves differently from one that needs their ground, and nearly everything else about the two orders follows from that.

So what killed them

If not a metabolic collapse, then what? The honest answer has three parts and they are not equally weighted.

Disease, first and overwhelmingly. The epidemics arrived ahead of the conquerors — the outbreak that killed Huayna Capac and his heir reached the Andes before Pizarro did — and recurred across the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The inverse relationship between decline and altitude is the signature of a pathogen environment, not of a tax schedule. No colonial policy caused this and no colonial policy could have prevented it.

The order's contribution, second, and it is real. Concentration of a dispersed population into towns is an epidemiological act whatever else it is. The mita moved tens of thousands of men annually across hundreds of miles between disease environments and altitudes, and returned those who survived. Huancavelica poisoned its workers with mercury dust because the guild did not sink a ventilation shaft. Extraction at a rate fixed against a falling population raised the real burden on survivors decade by decade. Flight broke households. None of this caused the collapse; all of it worsened it, and some of it — the ventilation shaft — was a choice made by identifiable people who knew.

And the deaths that were simply killings. The conquest, the sixteen years of Spanish civil war, the campaigns of the 1530s and the destruction of Vilcabamba. Then the rising of 1780–83, whose toll is given in the reference literature as around a hundred thousand indigenous and between ten and forty thousand non-indigenous — estimates, not counts. And the Atlantic passage that brought something over ninety-five thousand to a hundred thousand enslaved Africans to Peru, a figure that is itself a floor and excludes those who died before landing.

The credit column, at full weight

The discipline requires the coordination to be counted at the same weight and in the same breath, so count it.

The viceroyalty ran for two hundred and ninety-two years and it was not, for most of them, a war zone. It maintained a court system that the conquered used, extensively and sometimes successfully, against their conquerors — a genuinely unusual fact that this study has already set out and does not retract. It founded a university at Lima in 1551. It built a legal architecture that recognised indigenous community landholding and defended it, imperfectly, against settler encroachment for three centuries — which is why Andean communities still held land in 1824 and Irish tenants did not. It standardised and printed the Quechua language, and produced the grammars and dictionaries by which that language survives in written form. It integrated the Andes into a world economy on terms nobody there had chosen but which were not, for every participant, only extractive: the muleteers, the coca growers, the market women of Potosí, the artisan communities that grew around the silver were doing business, not only being robbed.

And the peace itself must be counted, because peace is the coordination that everything else rests on. The Andes between 1572 and 1780 saw nothing remotely like the wars of the preceding forty years.

Refusing both syllogisms

The framework requires two refusals here and Peru tempts both.

The conqueror's syllogism — order is necessary, therefore *this* order was — fails because the alternative is in the record. Tawantinsuyu was also an order, also coordinated, also extracted labour, also kept roads and storehouses; its collapse was not a return to anarchy but a takeover. The question was never order against chaos. It was whose order, taking what, from whom.

And the sentimental mirror — that the price proves only cruelty — fails against the evidence in this study of officials who resigned, friars who reported, judges who ruled for indigenous plaintiffs, an emperor who suspended the conquests to hold a hearing, and a

viceroy who wrote to Madrid that the forasteros could not be made to return. The order contained people who fought it from inside, using its own instruments, sometimes winning.

Both refusals point at the same place. The cost was enormous, most of it was disease and could not have been prevented by anyone, and the part that was chosen was chosen by people operating a machine for turning Andean labour into silver — who mostly believed they were also saving souls, who were sometimes right that they were also keeping a peace, and who did not stop.

The accounting in omissions

The card warns that where an order was cheap, the accounting must be conducted in omissions, because instruments built to count commissions return a null result on a school unbuilt. Peru was not a cheap order, so the warning applies differently — but there is one omission that should be entered, and it is the largest single item this module can name that the standard instruments miss.

Nobody knows how many died, and the reason nobody knows is that the order stopped counting when counting became inconvenient. Toledo's inspection of the 1570s produced the best population data in the colonial Andes. The next general count was attempted in 1683 and failed. For roughly a century the state assessed a fixed sum against a census it declined to update, and the viceroys' own periodic estimates of decline — sixty-six per cent by 1633, eighty by 1663 — are administrative guesses against a baseline a century old, conflating the dead with the departed because the administration could not distinguish them and had no incentive to try.

The historiographical uncertainty this module opened with is therefore not a natural feature of a distant past. It is partly an artefact of a fiscal decision: a state that would have had to lower its assessment if it counted, and did not count. The silence in the record is an item in the accounting, and the men who produced it are identifiable.

Reading the accounting against the framework

The correction to the inheritance, stated plainly. The predicted confirmation does not survive. The reducciones did not destroy Andean verticality; the resettlement was negotiated so as to preserve access across ecological tiers, on the best modern evidence, and the Andean lords participated in it. A study wanting to rest weight on the opposite conclusion would need to argue against Mumford directly.

The contribution that replaces it, and I think it is stronger than what it replaces. Metabolic debt is not a consequence of conquest but of the extraction fork. Where the conqueror wants the labour, he has a direct interest in the producer's ability to survive a bad year, and will preserve — sometimes deliberately, sometimes by negotiating with the people

who understand it — the diversification that provides it. Where he wants the ground, the producer's subsistence is an obstacle to be compressed, and the portfolio collapses toward the single crop that feeds a family on the smallest plot. Ireland and Peru are the same mechanism at opposite settings, and the variable is the one this study has now found doing the work in three separate modules: does the extractor need this man alive and here?

A confirmation, marked as one. The metabolic-death test holds. The framework predicts that the mass death a collapse collects is proportional to how much genuine life-sustaining coordination the order was performing. Peru's *collapse* in 1824 was demographically unremarkable — the wars were destructive but there was no famine, because the coordination the viceroyalty performed was governance, revenue and commerce rather than the subsistence metabolism itself, which remained where it had always been, in the household and the ayllu. The catastrophic mortality of this case belongs at its *beginning*, not its end, and it arrived with the pathogens rather than with the administration.

A note on sources. The pre-contact estimates are given as the published positions of the named scholars — Dobyns at around 37.5 million, Smith at a little over 12 million, Wachtel at approximately 10 million, Cook's ecological ceiling at 13.3 million — as reported in the reference and review literature; the highest figures are not widely accepted and none is endorsed here. Cook's implied average decline on the order of ninety per cent between 1520 and 1630 is as characterised in the contemporary review of his *Demographic Collapse* (1981). The coast/highland depopulation ratios attributed to Smith and Cook are as reported in Linda Newson's review literature and are ratios of decline over stated periods, not annual rates. Murra's vertical archipelago is drawn from his published work and the standard summaries, principally resting on the Chucuito visita of 1567 and the Huánuco material; the critiques noted — adaptationism, the widening of the model, the underweighting of horizontal exchange — follow Browman, Van Buren, Earle and the isotopic literature as summarised in the reference works, paraphrased. Mumford's findings on the negotiation of ecological access within the resettlement, the figure of more than a million people in some six hundred reducciones, and his short-term-failure/long-term-success conclusion are from *Vertical Empire* (2012) as reported in the published reviews; I have not read the monograph itself, and a study resting weight on this should. Casualty figures for 1780–83 and the totals for enslaved Africans imported to Peru are estimates with wide ranges, as noted in earlier modules. The claim that the historiographical uncertainty is partly an artefact of the state's refusal to re-count is my own inference from the fixed-assessment evidence established in the extraction module; it is an argument, not a documented intention, and the simpler explanation — that a general inspection was expensive and disruptive — is available and probably also true.

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Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

MODULE 12 · CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE

Whether He Needs the Man or the Ground

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

One finding, built across twelve modules

The framework's discipline is that a study claiming a revision in every module has usually manufactured most of them. This one produced a great many candidates and most of them are applications rather than additions. So state the single thing first, because it is the same thing seen from four positions, and everything else in this closing is either a consequence of it or a smaller separate item.

The variable that sets the shape of a conquest order is whether the conqueror needs the producer or the producer's ground.

The Field Manual already names this fork, and names it correctly, inside the extraction module: extraction-as-rate needs the native alive and tends to equilibrium; extraction-as-dispossession needs him gone and tends to elimination. What Peru shows is that the fork is not a fact about extraction. It is the master variable, and it reaches into modules the card does not currently connect to it.

The settlement's object. Peru divided tribute streams and left the land alone for sixty years, because the conquered order was already collecting from households and a going tax machine is worth more than a title deed. Kenya, Algeria and Buganda perform conversions on land because in each the object was ground. The instrument a settlement reaches for is set by what the conqueror is trying to obtain, and that in turn by what the previous conquest left standing.

The exit dial's setting. At Potosí the drafted man was paid four reales and the free man eleven or twelve for the same work in the same mountain — and some of the free men were the same men, working their off-weeks. An extractor who needs labour bids for a subject who can leave. An extractor who needs land does not bid at all; he shuts the door or opens it to empty the country.

The subsistence portfolio. The Spanish negotiated the resettlement so that Andean lineages kept access across ecological tiers, because a household that cannot survive a bad year pays no tribute and fills no draft. The Irish landlord compressed the tenant onto the single crop that feeds a family on the smallest plot, because grazing was worth more than the tenant. Same mechanism, opposite settings.

And the collapse. Peru's catastrophic mortality sits at its beginning and arrived with pathogens; its end in 1824 was demographically unremarkable, because the coordination the viceroyalty performed was governance and revenue rather than the subsistence metabolism itself.

Stated for the corpus: ask, of every conquest, whether the conqueror wants the man or the ground — and expect that single answer to predict the settlement's fiction, the exit dial's setting, the extraction's medium, the fate of the subsistence base, and where in the order's lifespan the mass death falls. The card should move this fork out of Module 6 and into the spine.

The smaller additions, culled

Five others survive as genuine and separable, and I state them briefly rather than re-arguing them.

The frozen assessment. A collective levy fixed at a census and not revised is an automatically escalating per-capita tax during population decline — escalating invisibly, with no decree, nobody responsible, and nothing for a petition to name. Toledo's assessment of the 1570s ran until the 1680s against a falling population. Look for it wherever an order assesses communities rather than individuals and then fails to re-survey.

The sold office. Where a state solves the open problem by rotating salaried outsiders and then sells those offices for cash, each buyer becomes a proprietor who must extract to recoup. The extraction is structural rather than corrupt: it is amortisation. Corregimientos entered the saleable list in 1678, audiencia seats in 1687; the reparto was the recovery instrument; its abolition was the rebels' first demand in 1780.

The register. Formation installs through the administration of the life cycle rather than the persuasion of the mind. Spain held every office by which a person is born, married, made legitimate and buried; Britain in Ireland never did, because a parallel Catholic structure the state did not staff carried all three. That difference, not the destruction of a rival carrier, is what separates the outcomes.

The measured-surplus fiction. A vacancy fiction that never calls the country empty: it allots the inhabitants what they may reasonably need, confirms them in it, and declares all the rest free to grant and dispose of at the King's will — after the state's own resettlement has produced the surplus. Harder to argue against than the Lockean form, because it concedes your title and takes only the difference. This belongs on the card's list of settlement fictions as a third variant of vacancy.

The seat and the right. Where a factional fight produces a right, the residue widens over time, because admitting others costs incumbents nothing directly. Where it produces a *seat* in a fixed body, the residue is capped and the definition of personhood is adjusted until the

arithmetic works. Cádiz had fifteen or sixteen million Americans against ten or eleven million peninsulars, and the answer was to make citizenship conditional for those of African descent — a solution both sides accepted, from opposite motives.

Everything else this study produced — the reporting class that holds a seam open, the substitution that follows a refuted robe, the docket that reveals which way a surveillance apparatus faces, the conquest by a successor fragment of the same order — I offer as observations for the next case rather than as revisions. They rest on one instance each.

Three inherited predictions this study broke

The seed written for this case carried predictions and instructed me to try to break them. Three broke, and the corrections matter more than the confirmations.

One: colonial formation did not succeed here the way the inheritance assumed, and Spain did not destroy the rival carrier. The hypothesis was that Britain funded a rival formation and could not steer it while Spain destroyed one. Spain spent a century and a half failing to destroy it and left the archive proving so: 679 practising religious specialists in thirty-one villages in 1618, an idolatry inspectorate still running visitations in the 1660s, and 477 bodies dug back out of consecrated ground. The Church also evangelised *in* Quechua, standardised it, printed it, and left prayer translations still in use — and Quechua's serious decline is dated by linguists to somewhere between 1750 and 1850, straddling the viceroyalty's end. Whatever produced Andean Catholicism, it was not the smashing of the huacas in the seventeenth century.

Two: the demographic ratio governs a settler faction's capacity to separate, and Ireland's proposition survives. The seed predicted Peru would show the metropolitan floor's availability to be everything and the ratio to be irrelevant. Napoleon removed Spain's floor entirely in 1808. Peru's creoles did not separate; they made Lima the royalist base for the counter-revolution against Quito, Upper Peru and Chile, and independence arrived from outside at Ayacucho in December 1824. The stated reason is 1780: the indigenous majority could not be mobilised without endangering the creoles themselves. The mechanism needs restating — the settler's dependence is not on the metropole's soldiers but on not having to open the sovereignty question in front of a majority with a better claim to the ground — but the proposition holds.

Three: the reducciones did not destroy Andean verticality. The predicted confirmation, that Toledo destroyed exactly the diversification Ireland identified, is refuted by the modern work on the resettlement, which finds the ecological access negotiated and preserved. That refutation produced the study's central finding, which is the better trade.

Against the corpus

Menu classification. Peru is a blend and the blend is dated. *Assume the chair* at the level of the conquered — the kuraka was a functioning office with an existing warrant and a stranger could sit above it, which is why a few thousand Spaniards could tax millions across an enormous vertical territory. The card predicts such a chair will drift toward *Co-opt* as the warrant erodes, and Peru drifts exactly so: exemptions, the honorific *don*, noble recognition, the college at Cuzco taking the heir for eight years, hereditary confirmation — a rising pile of payments for what the office once commanded free. And *Rotate* at the level of the coordinating class, corroded not by Ottoman-style entropy but by deliberate sale.

That last is what Peru adds to the Menu's evidentiary base. The Ottoman prevention machine decayed because nobody had an interest in enforcing its rules. The Peruvian rotation machine was sold, for cash, by the apex that built it, to meet war expenditure — and the buyers were precisely the men the design existed to exclude. An apex short of money will sell the instrument that solves its open problem, because that instrument is the most valuable thing it owns.

Against Ireland, which this case was chosen to control. The two orders diverge on formation, on land, and on the shape of liberty, and every divergence traces to the master variable or to the register. Spain taxed the Andean household and therefore preserved the community's land, its subsistence portfolio and its lord; Britain wanted Irish ground for grazing and therefore did none of those things. Spain held the whole life cycle and got, eventually, a genuine naturalisation; Britain faced a parallel Catholic structure it did not staff and got 1880. Ireland's liberties were real and *suspendable*, generating agitation, repression and political prisoners; Peru's were real and *categorical*, generating three centuries of litigation to be reclassified. Where liberties are suspendable people organise to keep them; where they are categorical people queue to enter them, which is more stable for the order.

Against the corpus's colonial bend. The card predicts a reversed robe cut for the metropole rather than the conquered, formation withheld from the majority, and a seam split by distance. Peru inverts the first two and complicates the third. The robe *was* addressed to the conquered, because the papal grant conveyed the Indies for the propagation of the faith and made the state of Andean souls evidence about the validity of Spanish title. Formation was not withheld; it was pressed, in the conquered's own language, at enormous expense, for three centuries. And the seam stayed open across an ocean with no electorate at all, because a licence conditional on evangelisation manufactures a professional class whose job requires it to report. Where a colonial title is conditional on something the conquered do, the colonial bend does not apply. That is the condition to check before applying it to any case.

The strongest counter-position

Now the case for the order, and it should be put at its full strength, because it is serious and it is made by serious people.

It runs: the Black Legend is not history but a four-century political instrument of Spain's enemies, and Las Casas is its founding document, written by a partisan and printed in Amsterdam and London for reasons that had nothing to do with Andeans. Spain is the only European power that publicly debated the legality of its own conquest, suspended it to do so, and let the argument be published — and the men who made the argument were its own theologians, funded by its own Crown, and they were listened to. The legal protections were not decorative: indigenous communities litigated constantly, from the 1550s, with funded assistance, and won often enough that the archives are full of their victories. The Crown recognised and defended community landholding for three centuries, which is why Andean communities still held land at independence.

And then the comparison. The indigenous population of the Andes survived. It is still there. It speaks Quechua and Aymara, holds land, and constitutes a large share of two modern republics. Set that beside the settler colonies of North America and Australia, where the indigenous population was reduced to a remnant and the land taken entire. The catastrophic mortality of the sixteenth century was overwhelmingly epidemic, arrived before the conquerors in the north, could not have been prevented by any policy available to anyone, and ran inversely with altitude — which is a fact about pathogens, not about tax schedules. Spanish America produced mestizaje where the Anglophone colonies produced elimination. The order was Catholic, legalistic, and constrained by its own doctrine, and those constraints were real and can be dated.

That case is not answered by disputing its facts, because its facts are largely correct. It is answered by four refusals, and each has to be made rather than gestured at.

Refuse the syllogism. The order lasted 292 years and its subjects' descendants survive, and neither is a verdict in its favour. Durability is a fact about incentive structure, and this study has spent twelve modules describing the specific incentive structure: a royal fifth approaching a quarter of Crown revenue, a mercury monopoly on the input to the silver, a labour draft subsidising the mine at a third of the going wage, and a chain of beneficiaries each defending the whole by defending himself. Survival is what that arrangement bought. It is not what it earned.

Refuse the rigged comparison. Setting Spanish America against British North America is a comparison of two conquests, not a comparison of conquest with self-rule. And the foreclosed local alternative is in the record and should be named: Tawantinsuyu was also an order, also coordinated, also extracted labour, also kept roads and storehouses and a calendar and a law. Its own naturalisation was incomplete and its subject peoples had grievances — the Cañari and Chachapoya who fought beside the Spanish are the proof. What was foreclosed was not a paradise. It was a different order, in the middle of its own build, whose subsequent

history nobody can now know.

Refuse credit for parsimony — and here the refusal inverts, which is the sharpest thing this case does to the corpus. In the cheap colonies the card warns that mildness is a fact about the endowment rather than the conqueror's character. Peru was not cheap and was not mild, and yet the same refusal applies in reverse: the protections that make the strongest case for this order exist because the order was taxing the people it protected. The community kept its land because a landless community pays no tribute. The lineages kept their ecological access because a household that starves fills no draft. The kuraka kept his standing because the tribute ran through him. The courts were open to the conquered because the conquered were the Crown's lever against its own settlers. Every item in the counter-position's list is real, was exercised, and is a fact about what the extractor needed rather than about what he believed. That is not a debunking; it is a description of the mechanism, and it holds whether or not any individual Spaniard was sincere.

And refuse cynicism, which is the refusal this study most needs to make. A built thing that became real is not a lie, and the people formed by it are not dupes. Andean Catholicism is genuinely Andean and genuinely Catholic; the people who hold it are not performing, and naming its constructed origin does not touch its reality. The same is true of the order it displaced — Tawantinsuyu was a conquest under a century old when Pizarro landed, and that fact does not make its defenders dupes either. Both were built. Both, in their different degrees, became real. The men who ran the viceroyalty included cynics and believers and a great mass of people who had simply inherited positions and defended them, and the framework's whole point is that you cannot tell them apart from the outside and do not need to.

What the case was for

The Reader addendum that governs this module holds that case selection is strategic rather than completist — that a study is a door into a room a particular reader cannot otherwise enter, and that a mechanism met on unimplicated ground is a mechanism the reader brings home himself.

Ireland was the implicated case for an Anglophone reader. Peru is the unimplicated one, and the mechanisms it carries are not Spanish. A tax payable only in the conqueror's coin, levied on a household that holds none, is the hut tax of British Africa running three centuries early on a different continent, reached independently. A resettlement that produces a surplus of land which the state then sells is the enclosure and the Crown Lands Ordinance. An office sold to a man who must then recoup it from the governed is the tax farm and the purchased commission. A parliament that decides who counts as a person because the seats are fixed is the Act of Union's hundred seats of six hundred and fifty-eight.

The arithmetic of this case is now on the page: what was taken, at what rate, in what medium, from whom, by whose hands, with what written down at each stage and by whom, and what it cost, on every side, counted at the same weight.

A note on sources. This module rests on the eleven that precede it and adds no new evidence; the sourcing, contested figures and stated uncertainties are given at the foot of each. The three refuted predictions are the seed's own, offered by the previous study in this collection with the instruction to break rather than confirm them, and the corrections are recorded in the modules where they arose — formation in Module 4, the settler ratio in Module 10, the vertical portfolio in Module 11. The demographic estimates remain contested and no figure is asserted anywhere in this study. The characterisation of the Black Legend and White Legend as positions with sponsors is the seed's, and is shared. Las Casas has been used throughout as evidence of what a Dominican could say to a king and have acted upon, not as a source for what happened in the Indies. The strongest counter-position above is assembled from the arguments made by defenders of the Spanish colonial record in the historiographical debate, stated as they would state it and not as a straw version; readers wishing to encounter it in its own voice should go to that literature directly rather than to this summary of it.

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